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I. Introduction 
The control of State aid in the European Community is directly linked to the 
realisation of a system of undistorted competition as stipulated in Art. 3(g) 
EC Treaty. For this reason, State aid provisions must be functionally inter-
preted in light of this objective.1 The stimuli provided by free competition 
are indispensable for an efficient allocation of resources. If these criteria 
are not applied, products will no longer be manufactured where conditions 
are most favourable, but in that member country which is willing to give the 
company the ”biggest gift”. However, such interference with the system 
may possibly be warranted where the market forces alone are only able to 
achieve the desired result very slowly or to an insufficient extent. 
 
The EC Treaty stipulates the fundamental incompatibility of State aid with 
the common market (Art. 87(1) EC Treaty). However, the rule provided by 
Art. 87(1) EC Treaty is modified by numerous legal exceptions (Art. 87(2) 
EC Treaty) and by a broad scope of discretion on the part of the Commis-
sion in respect of further possible exemptions (Art. 87(3) EC Treaty). The 
provisions regarding exemptions as such have such substantial scope; 
economic aspects are taken into consideration as much as social or histori-
cal circumstances (Art. 87(2)(c) EC Treaty). The review of State aid and the 
imposition of sanctions on unlawful State aid are carried out by the Euro-
pean Commission (Art. 88 EC Treaty). Member States are obliged to notify 
the Commission in order to enable it to fulfil this function. 
 
European competition law has always sought to control the granting of sub-
sidies by Member States.2 This leads to perceptible curtailment of the 
Member States’ sovereignty and of the scope of their economic policies.3 
This is based on the consideration that an uncoordinated coexistence of 
national subsidies of varying intensity would deadlock the economic proc-
ess of integration and its aim of achieving a homogeneous market.4 Subsi-
1NICOLAYSEN, p. 120. 
2The early ban of State aid in Art. 4(c) ECSC, which is even stricter than the ban in 
Art. 87 EC Treaty. For the sobering legal reality in the ECSC, see 
BÖRNER/BULLINGER, pp. 197 ff. 
3Thus also G/B/T/E-Wenig, Art. 87, mrg. no. 3. 
4ZIPPEL, p. 4. 
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dies granted by individual member countries cause defensive subsidies to 
be introduced in other countries, thus resulting in a cumulation of measures 
which distort competition.5 Moreover, State aid can be used as a protec-
tionist instrument to favour domestic industries, to provide them with a 
competitive edge and to circumvent necessary structural adaptations by 
passing the difficulties on to competitors in other countries.6 According to 
BÖRNER/BULLINGER, uncontrolled national State aid would transform the 
common market into a ”finance ministers’ wrestling match”.7 In addition, 
State aid review seeks to reduce budget deficits, thereby contributing to the 
objective of monetary union review. Furthermore, the Commission regards 
State aid as a means of reinforcing economic and social coherence be-
tween prosperous and less prosperous regions.8 
 
Among undertakings, subsidies result in a ”State aid mentality”: companies 
that are in difficulty immediately turn to the government for help instead of 
tackling their problems with the use of their own resources under their own 
steam. This attitude is fostered in particular if competitors in other member 
countries receive or are entitled to State aid.9 In general, however, it must 
be the task of the company itself to achieve financial results which enable it 
to create the prerequisites for its own equilibrium, and to raise the means 
for any structural adaptations it must carry out to counter market pres-
sure.10 In the Commission’s view, only a small proportion of the macroeco-
nomic gains expected from the completion of the single market would be 
achieved if industry’s restructuring process were to be impeded by State 
aid.11 Moreover, there is a danger that companies’ choice of branch offices 
and production plants would be influenced by competition between national 
State aid offers. This leads to the so-called ”Delaware effect”: locations are 
no longer chosen on account of market factors but on the strength of gov-
ernment incentives expressed in the framework of tax and company law.12 
The Community has always considered such conditions to be incompatible 
                                                
520th Report on Competition Policy, p. 143. 
612th Report on Competition Policy, p. 117. 
7BÖRNER/BULLINGER, pp. 197 ff. 
821st Report on Competiton Policy, p. 23. 
911th Report on Competition Policy, p. 123. 
10Commission Decision of 27/11/1985, 3484/85/ECSC, O.J. 1985 No. L230/1. 
1120th Report on Competition Policy, p. 143. 
12TIMMERMANS, pp. 1 ff., 14. 
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with the principle of undistorted competition in the European market.13 The 
Commission attributes increasing importance to State aid (mal)practices in 
member countries.14 This is understandable if we keep in mind the extent of 
State aid granted within the European Union. 
 
Subsequent to multilateral consultations, the Commission first published a 
report on State aid in 1988.15 This report emphasizes that the Commission 
regards competition as the most important guarantor of the completion of 
the single market. In view of the latter objective, the Commission is pursu-
ing a policy of strict State aid control in an effort to prevent the advantages 
to be expected from the integration of national economies from being 
placed in jeopardy.16 It holds the view that in a more strongly integrated 
market, certain types of State aid will distort competition to a correspond-
ingly greater extent.17 In this context, the Commission, in 1993, described 
the surveillance of so-called sensitive sectors18 as a task of highest prior-
ity.19 
 
The Commission has developed strict standards for the control of State aid. 
These are partially laid down in the form of general principles and guide-
lines. The Commission has decided to convene regular biyearly multilateral 
meetings with State aid experts from all the member countries. These 
meetings are supposed to serve as a forum for the discussion of proposals 
regarding the design of general policy and for the formulation of State aid 
frameworks20 in key sectors before such proposals are adopted by the 
Commission. 
 
                                                
13Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671: One of the main ob-
jectives of Article 87 is to prevent the displacement of industry caused by ”bidding 
up” on investment projects through the machinery of aid. 
1422nd and 23rd Reports on Competition Policy. 
1518th Report on Competition Policy, p. 148. 
1620th Report on Competition Policy, p. 144. 
1723rd Report on Competition Policy, p. 15. 
18Sensitive sectors include industries with chronic structural problems such as 
shipbuilding, steel, synthetic fibers, and the motor vehicle industry. 
19Thus verbatim in the 23rd Report on Competition Policy, p. 15. 
20Such Community frameworks exist for (among other industries) shipbuilding, 
textiles, synthtic fibers, the motor vehicle industry, for R&D, and for SMEs. The 
1997 Community Framework for State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry will build 
the main part of the following discussion, see IV. 
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In addition, from its earliest case law, the European Court of Justice has 
expressed the conviction that subsidies run counter to the essential objec-
tives of the Community since they enable economic activities to be called 
into life, to be maintained or encouraged which do not accord with the most 
rational distribution of production at the highest level of performance. 
 
Within the outline of the first section of my investigation, the main focus is 
being directed towards the discussion about the general principles of EC 
State aids, whilst the most recent case law is clearly being emphasized. 
Further discussion is dedicated to the background and historical aspects 
related to sectoral aid. Above all, I would like to emphasize the fact that the 
main focus within the investigation is directed towards the main principles 
of State aid to the motor vehicle industry. Specific detail is provided on be-
half of the 1997 Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle 
industry. It is inevitable that the content of the texts provides a detailed de-
scription and explanation of the various inter-connections of the main topic 
and of all the various, specific aspects of sectoral aid, concerning the motor 
vehicle industry. 
 
To support a student by writing his master thesis is time consuming, taking 
considerable skill and infinite patience. Thus, I would like to thank Professor 
Peter Gjörtler for his help in this regard. 
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II. EC State Aids 
1. Definition 
The Treaty on European Union does not give an explicit definition of State 
aid. In the case law of the Commission and the ECJ it has been held to 
comprise any advantages granted directly or indirectly trough state re-
sources21. In order for a measure to constitute State aid, four cumulative 
conditions must be fulfilled. 
 
1.1. Incompatibility with the Common Market 
Under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty22, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threat-
ens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the produc-
tion of certain goods is incompatible with the common market, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States and save to the extent that the Treaty 
provides otherwise. The aim of Article 87 is to prevent trade between Mem-
ber States from being affected by advantages given by the the public au-
thorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.23 
 
                                                
21STEINER/WOODS, p. 198. 
22JONES/SUFRIN, p. 70. 
23E.g. Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, 
paragraph 71. In relation to the mechanics of applying the State aid rule, many 
older  cases are no longer relevant because of legislative changes made in the 
procedures to be followed by the Community institutions. More specific, see 
HANCHER/SLOT/OTTERVANGER, EC State Aids, D’SA, European Community Law on 
State Aid, BAUDENBACHER, A Brief Guide to European State Aid Law and EVANS, 
European Community Law of State Aid. Specific chapters  are devoted to State 
aids in BELLAMY/CHILD, European Union Law of Competition and 
RITTER/BRAUN/RAWLINSON, European Competition Law: a practitioner’s guide. Arti-
cles on this subject appear from time to time in European Competition Law Review 
(see, for example, VAN CALSTER/GREENING, The EC’s State Aid and Tax). 
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1.2. Prohibition 
It is implicit in the fact that such aids are incompatible with the common 
market that they are prohibited.24 The prohibition stems from a combination 
of the incompatibility of such aids with the common market and the obliga-
tions in Article 10 of the EC Treaty imposed on Member States to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from the 
Treaty, to facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks and to ab-
stain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the objec-
tives of the Treaty. 
 
1.3. Direct Effect 
The prohibition implicit in Article 87(1) is not direct effect, that is, it cannot 
be relied upon in litigation before the courts of a Member State.25 It oper-
ates within the procedural framework of Articles 87-89, which distinguishes 
between existing aid systems and new aids. Under Article 87(1), therefore, 
the grant of a State aid is not automatically contrary to the Treaty.26 The 
prohibition on existing aid systems is intended to take effect when it has 
been put into concrete form by acts having general application adopted by 
the Council under Article 89 or by individual decisions adopted by the 
Commission under Article 88(2),27 at which point reliance can be placed 
upon the prohibition in litigation before the courts of a Member State. Pro-
posals to introduce new aid or alter existing ones (which amounts to the 
introduction of a new aid) are subject to the procedure envisaged in Article 
88(3). That comprises a special prohibition on the implementation of the 
proposed aid pending the termination of the procedure, whether or not the 
aid is subsequently found to be incompatible with the common market.28 
That prohibition can be relied upon in litigation before the courts of a Mem-
ber State. 
 
                                                
24E.g. Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523. 
25Case 77/72 Capolongo v Maya [1973] ECR 611, paragraphs 5-6. See also Case 
74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] ECR 557, paragraphs 11-12, Case 78/76 Steinike & 
Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraphs 6-10. 
26Case 323/82 Intermills SA v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 32. 
27Case 77/72 Capolongo v Maya [1973] ECR 611, paragraphs 6. 
28Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 1471, paragraphs 4-6. 
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Thus, ”existing” aids29 are not subject to any prohibition derived directly 
from the Treaty. They can be prohibited with prospective effect by the Com-
munity institutions (normally the Commission); but, until prohibited, the aid 
is not unlawful. The position of ”new” State aids is somewhat different. 
Such aids have to be notified to the Commission before they are intro-
duced. If they are introduced without notification, they are automatically 
unlawful; and private persons may rely upon their illegality before national 
courts. If they are notified to the Commission before their introduction, no 
adverse legal consequences for the State aid flows unless and until the 
Commission reaches an adverse decision.30 Thus, upon notification to the 
Commission, a ”new” State aid becomes an ”existing” one. 
 
1.4. Relationship Between the State Aid Rules and other Treaty Provisions 
Certain elements of a State aid scheme may contravene Treaty provisions 
other than the State aid rules. Where those elements of the aid scheme are 
so indissolubly linked to the objective and functioning of the aid itself that it 
is impossible to evaluate them separately, the State aid rules will alone 
apply. The effect of such elements on the compatibility or otherwise of the 
aid scheme, viewed as whole, is determined under the procedure laid down 
in Article 88. On the other hand, where it is possible to distinguish between 
those elements of the aid scheme which are necessary for the attainment 
of its objective, or for its proper functioning, and those which are not, the 
latter may be dealt with under the appropriate Treaty provisions and will not 
stand or fall depending upon whether or not the aid scheme in its entirety is 
prohibited under Article 87 or is compatible with the common market (from 
the perspective of the State aid rule).31 Accordingly, a national court may 
find that a discrete part of a State aid scheme that infringes a Treaty provi-
                                                
29Existing aids are aids that were or are already in existence when Article 87 came 
or comes into effect within a Member State (the end of the transitional period, in 
the case of the six original Member States; or the date specified in the relevant Act 
of Accession, in the case of other Member States), aids that have lawfully been 
brought into effect after Article 87 came into force in the Member State concerned, 
and aids that for any other reason are deemed to be existing aids: see, in particu-
lar, Council Regulation No. 659/1999 (O.J. 1999 No. L83/1), Article 1(b). See also, 
in that connexion, Case C-295/97 Industrie Aeronautiche  Meccaniche Rinaldo 
Piaggo SpA v International Factors Italia SpA and others [1999] ECR I-3735, para-
graphs 47-48. 
30The procedure followed by the Commission is now to be found in Council Regu-
lation No. 659/1999 (O.J. 1999 No. L83/1). 
31Case 74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] ECR 557, paragraph 14. 
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sion other than the State aid rules (such as the free movement of goods 
rules) is unlawful even though the national court cannot find that the entire 
aid scheme is unlawful under the State aid rules.32 
 
2. The Concept of a State Aid 
To be caught by the Treaty, a State aid must possess the following fea-
tures: (a) it must be an ”aid”; (b) it must be ”granted by a Member State or 
through State resources”; (c) it must ”distort or threaten to distort competi-
tion by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”; 
and (d) it must affect trade between Member States. Although the wording 
of Article 87(1) permits those features to be separated from one another, 
there is in practice a close relationship between them. For example, the re-
quirement that there be an actual or threatened distortion of competition 
that takes the form of favouring undertakings or the production of certain 
goods (otherwise known as the ”selectivity” of the aid) is commonly re-
garded as a necessary feature of the concept of a State aid and not simply 
a s a consequence of a State aid (as defined) that renders it incompatible 
with the common market.33 
 
2.1. Aid 
”Aids” have been variously described as ”benefits”;34 ”gratuitous advan-
tages”;35 ”decisions of a Member States by which the latter, in pursuit of 
their own economic and social objectives, give by unilateral and autono-
                                                
32Iannelli v Meroni (above), paragraph 16. The ability of the national court so to rule 
depends upon the circumstances; Case 18/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 
1339, paragraph 13; Case 103/84 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 1759, paragraph 
19; More specific, FERNÁNDEZ FARRERES, p. 149. 
33Although the State aid regimes in the ECSC and EC Treaties are very different, 
they converge on the concept of a State aid; and the case law under either Treaty 
concerning that concept is transposable to the other Treaty (e.g. Cases T-129/95, 
T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR 
II-17, paragraph 17). Accordingly, cases decided under the ECSC Treaty and con-
cerning the concept of a State aid are here cited in relation to the concept of an aid 
under the EC Treaty. Judicial review decisions concerning the concept of a State 
aid is materially different from judicial review of decisions in the compatibility or 
otherwise of a State aid with the common market: Case T-95/94 Sytraval & Brink’s 
France v Commission [1995] ECR II-2651, paragraph 54. 
34Case 173/73 Commission v Italy [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13. 
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mous decision, undertakings or other persons resources or procure for 
them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of the economic or 
social objectives sought”;36 ”positive benefits, such as subsidies them-
selves, also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which 
are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without 
therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in 
character and have the same effect”;37 and ”an economic advantage which 
the recipient would not have obtained under normal market conditions”.38 
 
2.2. Granted by the State or through State Resources 
The expression ”aid” necessarily implies advantages granted directly or 
indirectly through State resources or constituting an additional charge for 
the State or for bodies designated or established by the State for that pur-
pose.39 The phrase ”granted by the State or through State resources” 
makes it clear that it makes no difference whether the aid is granted directly 
by the State or by public or private bodies established or appointed by the 
State to administer the aid: in applying the State aid rules, regard must pri-
marily be had to the effects of the aid on the undertakings or products fa-
voured by it and not on the status of the institutions entrusted with the dis-
tribution and administration of the aid. Further, a measure adopted by pub-
lic authority and favouring certain undertakings or products may still be an 
aid even if it is wholly or partially financed by contributions imposed by pub-
lic authority and levied on the undertakings concerned.40 Thus, a benefit 
may be an aid if it has been decided upon and financed by a public body, 
implemented subject to the approval of the public authorities, granted in the 
                                                                                                                          
35Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany Commission v Italy [1977] ECR 595, 
paragraph 22. 
36Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit [1980] ECR 
1205, paragraph 31. 
37Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Sevola [1998] ECR I-7907, 
paragraphs 34-35. Although that statement was made in the context of the ECSC 
Treaty, the judgement in fact emphasizes the conceptual similarity between aids 
under that Treaty and aids under the EC Treaty. 
38Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 60. 
39Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Sevola [1998] ECR I-7907. 
40Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraphs 21-22; 
Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 16. 
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same way as an ordinary State aid, and represented as being part of a 
package of measures that are accepted as being State aids.41 
 
On the other hand, where an advantage is conferred by the State but it 
does not involve the employment of State resources, whether directly or 
indirectly, it is not a State aid.42 In one case, the alleged State aid was a 
legal provision relieving a particular undertaking from a generally applicable 
obligation imposed on employers to recruit staff under employment con-
tracts of indeterminate duration, as opposed to fixed term contracts. The 
legislation gave the favoured undertaking a flexibility not available to other 
undertakings operating in the same sector. Nonetheless, the advantage 
was not a State aid because it did not involve any direct or indirect transfer 
of State resources to the beneficiary.43 
 
A direct transfer is simply a payment. Indirect transfers encompass situa-
tions where the State forgoes a payment to which it would otherwise be 
entitled, such as where it creates a tax exemption and thereby accepts a 
drop in tax revenue but does not employ its resources for the benefit of the 
favoured undertaking in any positive way;44 and situations where the State 
provides funds to a person or body, enabling that person or body to release 
resources (whether the same or other resources) to an undertaking or for 
the production of certain goods.45 In order to be a State aid, an advantage 
must therefore involve some additional burden for the State. If the advan-
tage does not involve some additional burden, by comparison with the 
situation that would otherwise prevail, it may not be a State aid.46 
 
                                                
41Case 290/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 439, paragraphs 14-15; Case 
57/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 2855. 
42E.g. Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie v van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25, paragraphs 
24-25 (fixing of minimum retail prices); Cases 213-215/81 Norddeutsche Vieh- und 
Fleischkontor v BALM [1982] ECR 3583, paragraphs 22-23 (allocation of tariff 
quota opened by a Council Regulation – the levy waived was part of the Commu-
nity’s own resources, not State resources). 
43Case C-52/97, C-53/97 and 54/97 Viscido v Ente Poste Italiano [1998] ECR I-
2629, paragraphs 12-16. 
44The tax concession at issue in Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (Opinion 
of Advocate General Saggio, paragraph 30). 
45E.g. Case C-308/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 11-14. 
46Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servolo [1998] ECR I-7907, 
paragraph 43. 
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2.3. The Form of an Aid 
State aids can take all manner of forms. For example: preferential discount 
rates in respect of export credits;47 tax incentives for investments;48 reduc-
tions in employers’ social security contributions;49 a straightforward pay-
ment of money (as in the case of subsidy);50 investment in the capital of an 
undertaking;51 the giving of a guarantee;52 purchasing goods or services 
from the favoured undertaking in the absence of any, or any sufficient, de-
mand for them or at an overvalue.53 A tax concession or tax exemption that 
reduces the undertaking’s liability towards the State;54 aid for research and 
development;55 a deferral of  performance of an obligation to pay money to 
the State.56 
 
                                                
47Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v France  [1969] ECR 523; Commission’s Notice 
on the application of the State aid rules to short term export credit insurance, O.J. 
1997 No. C281/4. 
48Case 70/72 Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813. 
49Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709; Case C-251/97 France v 
Commission  [1999] ECR I-6639. On employment aids generally, see the Commis-
sion’s Notices in O.J. 1995 No. C334/4 and O.J. 1997 No. C1/10. 
50In the context of the State aid provisions of the ECSC Treaty, it has been held 
that: ”A subsidy is normally defined as a payment by the purchaser or consumer 
for the goods or services which it produces. An aid is a very similar concept, which, 
however, places emphasis on its purpose and seems especially devised for a par-
ticular objective which cannot normally be achieved without outside help.” Case 
30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority [1961] ECR 1 at 19. A subsidy is an aid 
even if it is granted because of some particular burden imposed by the State upon 
the recipient (in casu the performance of a public service obligation): Case T-46/97 
Sociedada Independente de Comunicacao v Commission, 10 May 2000, para-
graphs 77-85. 
51E.g. Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, paragraphs 25-26. 
The Commission has published guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid: see 
O.J. 1999 No. C288/2. 
52See in particular the Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules 
to guarantees (O.J. 2000 No. C71/14). 
53Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, 
paragraphs 71-76. 
54E.g. Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito Industrial v Ayuntamiento de Valencia 
[1994] ECR I-887, paragraphs 13-14; Case T-106/95 FFSA v Commission [1997] 
ECR II-229; Case C-6/97 Italy v Commission [1999] ECR I-2981. See also the 
Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to direct taxation (O.J. 
1998 No. C284/3). 
55See the Commission’s Communication published in O.J. 1996 No. C45/3. 
56Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing Ltd. v Commission [1998] ECR II-1, upheld on 
appeal in Case C-83/98 France v Ladbroke Racing Ltd. and another, 16 May 2000. 
But compare Case C-342/96 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-2459. 
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However, the form taken by an aid is not relevant.57 The intention of the 
Treaty is to cast a broad net and, more particularly, to bring within the con-
cept of a State aid caught by the Treaty anything that has all the features of 
a State aid irrespective of its ”form”.58 
 
2.4. The Private Investor Test 
An advantage accorded by the State will not be classified as a State aid if it 
is no different from what the favoured undertaking could have got from pri-
vate sector sources under normal market conditions.59 That principle, often 
referred to as ”the private investor test”, originated in cases involving in-
vestments in the capital of an undertaking or the grant of loans to an under-
taking, where the transaction was (or was said to be) in terms of its form 
and appearance identical to a standard commercial transaction. The ECJ 
was not prepared to accept that the Member States, or State bodies, were 
prevented by the Treaty from entering into ordinary commercial transac-
tions of that sort. On the other hand, it did take the view that such transac-
tions could be objectionable if a private sector investor (or lender, or what-
ever) would not have entered into the transaction at all (usually because of 
the perilous state of the recipient undertaking) or if the terms available from 
the private sector would have been different (that is, less favourable). In 
either event, the recipient undertaking would be getting from the State 
something that it would not otherwise have got, and it was therefore legiti-
mate to conclude that a State aid was involved.60 
 
When applying the private investor test, it is necessary to take a private 
sector comparison that is as close as possible to the transaction effected by 
                                                
57Article 87(1) refers to ”aids...in any form whatsoever”. See, for example, Case 
323/82 Intermills SA v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 31. 
58Accordingly, there is no room in the Treaty for the concept of a ”measure having 
equivalent effect to a State aid”: Case 290/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 
439. 
59E.g. Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 60. 
60E.g. Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraphs 14-15; 
Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321, paragraph 20; Case C-
303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraphs 20-24; Case C-305/89 
Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 19; Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 
and C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph 21; Case T-
358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109, paragraph 70. The principle 
can be traced back to the Advocate General’s Opinions in Case 84/82 Germany v 
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the State (or a State body) that is suspected of being a State aid and a 
comparator that is as close as possible to the person granting the aid in 
terms of the funds available. The private investor against whom the action 
of the State (or State body in question) is to be compared is not a particular 
person (such as a particular, or a typical, private sector investor in the 
Member State in question); nor is it an ideal or theoretical investor. Instead, 
it is a hypothetical reasonable investor applying ordinary commercial crite-
ria and operating under normal market conditions.61 
 
It is not necessarily the case that the hypothetical private investor would 
seek a profit in the short term because private investors may well be guided 
by the prospect of profitability in the longer term; but the general principle of 
the test is to determine whether or not the transaction would or could have 
been entered into with a private sector counterparty envisaging making a 
return on the transaction (or at least minimising losses) and leaving aside 
any consideration of the social, regional, sectoral or other policy considera-
tions that typically motivate the State (or State bodies).62 
 
The comparison with a private sector investor is not, however, exact in all 
respects. For example, a private sector operator might bear the losses of a 
subsidiary out of a desire to protect the image of the group or in order to 
carry out an orderly redirection of the group’s activities. Such considera-
tions must be left out of account when considering whether or not an ad-
vantage granted by the State (or a State body) is a State aid. The private 
investor test is focused rather more on the question whether or not the 
transaction that is alleged to be a State aid is ultimately going to be, or is 
expected to be, profitable.63 
 
In that connection, many investments made by prudent private sector in-
vestors involve some risk and, despite the existence of an intention that the 
investment shall bring a commercial return within a reasonable period, it 
                                                                                                                          
Commission [1984] ECR 1451 and Cases 296 and 318/82 Netherlans and Leeu-
warder Papierenfabrik v Commission [1985] ECR 809. 
61LASOK, p. 4-9. 
62Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke and others v 
Commission [1996] ECR II-17, paragraphs 104-140 (in particular, paragraph 132). 
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may turn out that no return can be made or that the investment is simply 
lost in whole or in part. The private investor test therefore involves a com-
parison with an hypothetical judgmental decision; and it is entirely possible 
that different private sector investors, acting reasonably and in accordance 
with commercial criteria under normal market conditions, could take differ-
ent views of the sense in making a particular investment and of the accept-
ability of the terms under which a particular investment was or would be 
made. Possibly for that reason, the private investor test is often applied in 
the cases in a negative rather than a positive sense: it is regarded as cru-
cial that the prospect of receiving an appropriate return on the advantage 
granted was simply disregarded; or that the circumstances were such that 
no private investor operating under normal market conditions would have 
done what the grantor of the alleged State aid did; or that no private inves-
tor operating under normal market conditions would have taken into ac-
count the considerations advanced to justify the alleged State aid.64 On the 
other hand, it would seem that, if the prospect of receiving a return did mo-
tivate the action of the grantor of the alleged State aid and the action taken 
fell within the range of possible decisions that a private sector investor 
might make, acting reasonably on the basis of commercial considerations 
and under normal market conditions, then the alleged State aid cannot be 
considered to be a State aid.65 
 
2.5. Relevance of Purpose 
An advantage granted by the State (or a State body) is nor excused from 
being a State aid merely because it serves some particular purpose or pol-
icy.66 The cultural, social or other aims of the advantage in question, but 
                                                                                                                          
63Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraphs 21-22; Cases 
T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke and others v Commis-
sion [1996] ECR II-17, paragraphs 123-128. 
64Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraphs 22 and 24; 
Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke and others v 
Commission [1996] ECR II-17, paragraphs 116-121 and 124. 
65LASOK, p. 4-11. 
66One of the early pronouncements on Article 87(1) was that it applied to ”deci-
sions of Member States by which the latter, in pursuit of their own economic and 
social objectives, give by unilateral and autonomous decisions, undertakings or 
other persons resources or procure for them advantages intended to encourage 
the attainment of the economic or social objectives sought”: Case 61/79 Amminis-
trazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit [1980] ECR 1205, paragraph 31. 
Thus, the existence of a purpose or objective served by a benefit granted by the 
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defined it in relation to its effects. The aims of the advantage in question, 
but defines it in relation to its effects. The aims of the advantage may be 
relevant when the Commission, in exercise of its power of constant review 
under Article 88 of the Treaty, rules on the compatibility with the common 
market of a measure already categorised as State aid and verifies whether 
that measure falls within the derogations provided for by Article 87(2) and 
(3).67 Equally, where a particular advantage granted by the State is objec-
tively justified on commercial grounds (and is not, for that reason, a State 
aid), the fact that it also furthers a particular political aim does not turn into 
a State aid.68 
 
It does not follow from the lack of relevance of the purpose of an alleged 
State aid that the legal or economic context must be ignored. In one case, it 
was held that a preferential gas tariff benefiting a particular class of un-
dertakings might not be a State aid if it were demonstrated that the tariff 
was objectively justified by economic reasons such as the need to resist 
competition on the same market from other sources of energy, the price of 
which was competitive.69 In another case, the argument that a system of 
special administration for insolvent undertakings gave rise to a State aid 
merely because the application of the system would produce a loss of tax 
revenue for the State (since insolvent undertakings to which the system 
applied would be sheltered from claims and the running of interest on their 
debts would be suspended) was rejected on the ground that that conse-
quence was an inherent feature of any statutory system laying down a 
framework for relations between an insolvent undertaking and the general 
body of creditors.70 In general terms, where a practice is justified objectively 
on commercial grounds, it is not a State aid irrespective of the existence of 
some other motive for its adoption.71 
 
                                                                                                                          
State (otherwise than in return for something of equivalent value supplied by the 
undertaking receiving the benefit) is indicative of the benefit being a State aid 
rather than a reason for deciding that it is not one. 
67Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraphs 12-13; Case T-
14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande v Commission [1999] ECR I-723, paragraph 79. 
68Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 79. 
69Case 67, 68 and 70/85 Van der Kooy v Commission [1988] ECR 219, paragraph 
30; Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraphs 10, 20. 
70Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola [1988] ECR I-7907, 
paragraph 36. 
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Accordingly, the broad wording of Article 87(1) does not signify that all ad-
vantages granted by a State, whether financed trough State resources or 
not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both 
advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a 
public or private body designated or established by the State.72 
 
3. Effect on Competition 
In order to be incompatible with the common market, a State aid must dis-
tort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods. Thus, there must be some causal connec-
tion between the State aid and the effect on competition.73 The analysis of 
the consequences of a State aid must take account of foreseeable changes 
in competitive conditions and alter over time.74 
 
3.1. Distortion or Threatened Distortion of Competition75 
As in the case of the competition rule applicable to undertakings, it is not 
necessary for there to be evidence of an actual effect on competition; it is 
sufficient if the State aid is capable of distorting competition.76 
 
3.2. Favouring Certain Undertakings or the Production of Certain Goods 
The requirement that a State aid favour ”certain” undertakings or the pro-
duction of ”certain” goods, otherwise known as the ”selectivity” of the aid, is 
one the defining features of a State aid.77 ”Selectivity” means that the aid is 
essentially discriminatory in nature because it benefits particular under-
takings or the production of particular goods. For example, a general meas-
ure affecting the national economy (such as, before Member States join the 
                                                                                                                          
71Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 79. 
72Case C-52/97 Viscido v Ente Poste Italiane [1998] ECR I-2629, paragraph 12-16 
and paragraph 16 of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. 
73Case 40/75 Société des Produits Bertrand SA v Commission [1976] ECR 1. 
74Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 
December 1999, paragraphs 211-218. 
75EVANS/MARTIN, pp. 79-111. 
76E.g. Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to T-607/97, T-
1/98, T-3/98 to T-6/98 and T-23/98 Alzetta Mauro and others v Commission, 15 
June 2000, paragraphs 76-82. 
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Euro-zone, devaluation of the national currency) would not be regarded as 
a State aid, because of its lack of selectivity, even though it might also be 
beneficial to national exporters. On the other hand, a preferential discount 
rate for exports is a State aid, even if applied to all domestic products, be-
cause it is of direct benefit to individual exporters.78 
 
For the purpose of determining whether or not an aid is ”selective”, the 
status of the undertakings or manufacturers benefiting from the alleged aid 
as public or private undertakings is irrelevant:79 hence, a benefit is selective 
even if it favours either certain goods produced by public sector undertak-
ings or certain goods produced by private sector undertakings (or certain 
goods produced by a mixture of the two). An aid is selective even if the 
number of recipients is, for some reason, indeterminate (in the sense of 
uncounted or difficult to count), as long as the class of recipients is defined 
in such a way as to exclude other undertakings.80 It seems arguable that a 
form of assistance may also be ”selective” even if it benefits all undertak-
ings or all goods in a particular Member State: the ”selectivity” arises from 
the fact that the assistance is not extended to all undertakings or all goods 
in the Community. 
 
3.3. De minimis 
Different views have been expressed as to whether or not a de minimis rule 
applies in the context of State aid.81 It has been suggested by an Advocate 
                                                                                                                          
77Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola [1988] ECR I-7907, 
paragraph 40. 
78Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523, paragraphs 20-21; 
Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 19. 
79Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraphs 17-18. 
80Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (pending), where a tax concession made 
available to beneficiaries was indeterminate (Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, 
paragraph 31). Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, para-
graphs 23-31; Case C-256/97 Demenagements-Manutention Transport SA [1999] 
ECR I-3913, paragraphs 27-30; Case C-295/97 Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccani-
che Rinaldo Piaggo SpA v International Factors Italia SpA and others [1999] ECR 
I-3735, paragraphs 37-43. 
81In principle, the question whether or not there is a de minimis rule divided into two 
parts: is there such a rule in relation to the required effect on competition; and is 
there such a rule in relation to the required effect on trade between Member 
States? In practice, little attention is paid to the difference between effect on com-
petition and effect on trade between Member States. Accordingly, both aspects of 
the de minimis question will be considered here. There is no de minimis rule in the 
State aid provisions of the ECSC Treaty because those provisions do not require a 
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General that the effect of a State aid must be significant for it to be incom-
patible with the common market.82 On the other hand, all attempts to relay 
on de minimis before the Community courts have so far been unsuccessful. 
That may be due to the fact that, hitherto, the de minimis argument has 
been based upon the relatively small size of the aid or the relatively small 
size of the recipient rather than upon the relatively small extent of the actual 
effect of the aid.83 Even a relatively small amount of aid can have a signifi-
cant effect where competition in the relevant market is strong.84 It has also 
been held that the capacity of a State aid to strengthen an undertaking’s 
competitive position is assessed by reference to the advantage given to the 
recipient and not by reference to the operating results of the undertaking’s 
competitors,85 which excluded another basis for describing the effect of a 
State aid as being de minimis. 
 
The Commission is empowered to introduce a de minimis rule by means of 
a regulation.86 Instead, it has issued a notice on the de minimis rule for 
State aid that is, at the least, indicative of the extent to which a new State 
aid must be notified to the Commission before it is brought into effect. Un-
der the Commission’s notice, the de minimis rule applies to the extent that 
all the aid granted to a particular undertaking (or for the production of par-
ticular goods), excluding export aid, does not exceed, in the aggregate, 
                                                                                                                          
State aid to distort competition in order to be prohibited: Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 
and T-97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke GmbH and another v Commission [1999] 
ECR II-17, paragraph 147. 
82Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959 at 1001. 
83Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 43 of the 
judgement; Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irelande v Commission [1999] ECR 
I-139, paragraphs 77-78; Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (pending), Opin-
ion of Advocate General Saggio, paragraph 33. In Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-
97/96 Neue Maxhuette Stahlwerke and others v Commission [1999] ECR II-17, 
paragraph 147, the CFI concluded that the State aid rules in the ECSC Treaty did 
not embody a de minimis rule because there was no requirement that a State aid 
should distort or threaten to distort competition. On the basis, it could be inferred e 
contrario that the requirement of an effect on competition in the EC State aid rules 
does indicate that those rules embody a de minimis rule. 
84Case 259/85 France v Commission [1987] ECR 4393, paragraph 24; Cases T-
298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to T-607/97, T-1/98, T-3/98 to T-
6/98 and T-23/98 Alzetta Mauro and others v Commission, 15th June 2000, para-
graphs 84-87. 
85Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irelande v Commission [1999] ECR I-139, 
paragraphs 77-78. 
86Council Regulation No. 994/98 (O.J. 1998 No. L142/1), Article 2. The Regulation 
therefore implies that a de minimis rule is contained within Article 87 and Article 88 
of the Treaty. If that were not the case, the Council would not have the power to 
empower the Commission to define such a rule. 
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EUR 100'000 over a three year period beginning when the first of the aid in 
question is granted.87 The Commission of the European Communities has 
recently adopted the regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty to de minimis aid.88 
 
4. Effect on Inter-State Trade 
The required effect upon inter-State trade is in principle no different from 
the effect required in the context of the competition rules applicable to un-
dertakings. The question of the application of a de minimis rule is consid-
ered above, in connection with the required effect on competition. Where 
State financial assistance strengthens the position of an undertaking vis-à-
vis other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade, the assistance 
must be regarded as affecting trade between Member States.89 Aid granted 
to an undertaking that does not export its products to other Member States 
is such as to affect trade between Member States where producers in other 
Member States compete with the recipient of the aid because, as a result of 
the assistance, domestic production may be maintained or increased in the 
face of competition from producers in other Member States, reducing the 
opportunities for those producers to export to the State concerned.90 Where 
the primary effect of the aid is to make investment in the undertakings 
benefiting from the aid more attractive, there may be an effect on inter-
State trade because, in principle, investment in every undertaking estab-
lished in another Member State that does not benefit from the aid is possi-
ble only under less favourable conditions.91 
 
                                                
87O.J. 1996 No. C68/9; O.J. 2000 No. C89/7. 
88Council Regulation No. 69/2001 (O.J. 2001 No. L10/30). 
89Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraphs 11; Case 
C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraphs 49-53. 
90Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19; Case C-
303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 27. 
91Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (pending), Opinion of Advocate General 
Saggio, paragraphs 29 and 31. 
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5. State Aids Compatible with the Common Mar-
ket 
There are two classes of State aid that are compatible with the common 
market: (i) State aids covered by the opening words of Article 87(1) (”Save 
as otherwise provided in this Treaty”) – the ”saving clause”; and (ii) State 
aids declared to be compatible with the common market by Article 87(2). 
 
5.1. The Saving Clause 
The saving clause relates in particular to the special provisions in the 
Treaty concerning agriculture and transport. 
 
5.2. Article 87(2) 
Three categories of State aid are deemed by the Treaty to be compatible 
with the common market and are therefore not prohibited: (i) aids having a 
social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that the aid is 
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products con-
cerned; (ii) aids to make good damage caused by natural disasters or ex-
ceptional occurrences; and (iii) aids granted to the economy of certain ar-
eas of the former Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of 
Germany, insofar as such aid is required in order to compensate for the 
economic disadvantages caused by the post-war division of Germany. As 
grounds for derogating from a general rule of incompatibility with the com-
mon market, those grounds must be strictly construed.92 The Commission 
exercises a discretionary power when deciding whether or not one of those 
grounds applies; and the degree of judicial intervention in the exercise of 
that power is limited.93 
 
                                                
92Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 
December 1999, paragraph 132. 
93In many cases, the ECJ or CFI has contented itself with saying that the person 
challenging the assessment made had not shown that the decision-maker (usually 
the Commission) had overstepped the limits to its discretion: see, for example, 
Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 
December 1999, paragraph 148. 
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5.3. Aids Having a Social Character 
Such aids comprise such things as grants to the indigent to enable them to 
buy fuel or other comforts. Such aids are permitted on the condition that 
particular products are not favoured by reference to their origin. Hence, it is 
possible for such an aid to favour one type of product over another (such as 
gas heating rather than electricity for domestic use); but it is not permissible 
for the aid to favour (for example) gas produced in one Member State at the 
expense of gas produced in another. Individual consumers must be the 
immediate recipients of the aid. If the immediate recipients of the aid are 
other persons, the aid cannot be regarded as compatible with the common 
market on this ground.94 
 
5.4. Natural Disasters and Exceptional Occurrences 
Aid may be granted to alleviate hardship and to finance the reconstruction if 
industrial plant that has been destroyed as a result of a natural disaster or 
an exceptional occurrence; but neither event justifies aid for general devel-
opment of the industries or regions affected by natural disaster or an ex-
ceptional occurrence.95 
 
5.5. Aids Compensating for the Division of Germany96 
Despite the reunification of Germany, the justification for special treatment 
of certain areas of Germany affected by the post-war division of the country 
has not disappeared as yet. However, aid to the economy of those areas is 
justified only to the extent that they have suffered from the existence of the 
former frontier between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, 
such as through geographical isolation, the interruption of communications 
or the loss of access to markets.97 
 
                                                
94Case 52/76 Benedetti v Munari Fratelli SAS [1977] ECR 163 (wheat bought with 
State funds at the intervention price was resold at a lower price for milling, resulting 
in a reduced price for bread; but the aid subsidised directly the milling industry 
rather than individual consumers). 
95E.g. Case C-364/90 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-2097. See also Commis-
sion Decision 91/175 concerning aid to assist certain areas of the Mezzogiorno 
affected by natural disasters (O.J. 1991 No. L86/23). 
96SCHÜTZ, p. 203; MÜLLER-GRAFF, pp. 37-65. 
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6. Aids that may Be Exempted From Prohibition 
Five categories of State aid may be exempted from prohibition: (i) aids to 
promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; (ii) aids to pro-
mote the execution of an important project of common European interest or 
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (iii) 
aids to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading condi-
tions to an extent contrary to the public interest; (iv) aids to promote culture 
and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions 
and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the com-
mon interest; and (v) such other categories of aid as may be specified by 
decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission.98 As grounds for derogating from a general rule of incompati-
bility with the common market, those grounds must be strictly construed.99 
 
The exercise of the discretion to exempt aids falling within one of those 
categories involves economic and social assessments which must be made 
in a Community context.100 In making its assessment, the Commission is 
entitled to require a compensatory justification for the aid, that is, a contri-
bution by the recipient of the aid to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community, as set out in Article 87(3), over and above the effects of the 
normal play of market forces.101 However, the breadth of the discretion is 
such that there is only a limited degree of judicial intervention in decisions 
to exempt an aid.102  
                                                                                                                          
97Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 
December 1999, paragraphs 129-131 and 134-137. 
98Article 87(3) of the Treaty. 
99E.g. Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 
15 December 1999, paragraph 167. 
100Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, para-
graph 24; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 34. 
101Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, para-
graph 26 of the judgement and paragraph 6 of the Opinion of Advocate General 
Capotorti; Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraphs 
55-58. 
102Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to T-607/97, T-1/98, T-
3/98 to T-6/98 and T-23/98 Alzetta Mauro and others v Commission, 15 June 2000, 
paragraph 130, where the grounds on which the courts will interfere with such an 
exercise of discretion were listed as being: breach of procedural rule; failure to give 
reasons; material error of fact; manifest error of appreciation; and misuse of power. 
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6.1. Aids to Promote Economic Development of Deprived Areas 
This category covers regional aids. The qualifying conditions for the ap-
proval of such aids are that the region to be benefited suffers from an ab-
normally low standard of living or serious underemployment. Both condi-
tions are assessed by reference to the position in the Community as a 
whole rather than the position in the Member State of which the region in 
question form a part.103 The Commission has published guidance on aid for 
large investment projects.104 
 
6.2. Aids for Important Projects or to Remedy Serious Disturbances 
A project is not of common European interest unless it forms part of a 
transnational European programme supported jointly by a number of gov-
ernments of the Member States or arises from concerted action by a num-
ber of Member States to combat a common threat, such as environmental 
pollution.105 The ”serious disturbance” referred to is a disturbance in the en-
tire national economy of a Member State.106 Whether or not there is a ”seri-
ous” disturbance in the economy of a Member State that would justify ex-
emption from the prohibition on State aids is to be determined by reference 
to conditions in the Community; if other Member States are in a worse 
situation, a disturbance in the economy of one particular Member State 
cannot be said to be ”serious”.107 
                                                                                                                          
To those should be added error of law (for example, where the Commission mis-
takenly construes one of the grounds of exemption as applying to a certain situa-
tion when, properly construed, it does not). In Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freis-
taat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 December 1999, paragraph 169, the 
CFI added that the courts cannot substitute their own assessments for those of the 
Commission. 
103Thus, in Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, 
the ECJ upheld a Commission decision not to approve a Dutch aid scheme be-
cause, although it would have benefited a region of the Netherlands whose unem-
ployment rate was higher and per capita income lower than the average in the 
country, conditions in that region were still better than the average in the Commu-
nity. 
104O.J. 1998 No. C107/7. 
105Cases 62 and 72/87 Executif Regional Wallon and Glaverbel v Commission 
[1988] ECR 1573, paragraph 22. 
106Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission, 15 
December 1999, paragraph 167-168. 
107Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, para-
graph 25. 
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6.3. Aids for the Development of Economic Activities or Areas 
Aids falling within this category can be applied to individual regions of a 
Member State or specific economic sectors. The key concept, so far as 
such aid is concerned, is that of ”development”.108 Aid merely to save a 
bankrupt or moribund undertaking or to save jobs will not be exempted un-
der this category.109 On the other hand, the settlement of an undertaking’s 
existing debts, in order to ensure its survival (which is ordinarily prohibited), 
does not necessarily affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest where it is accompanied by a restructuring plan.110 Even if 
an aid facilitates development, it will not be exempted if it would adversely 
affect trading conditions contrary to the common interest.111 That may arise 
if the aid, even if beneficial in itself, is financed by a method that would ad-
versely affect trading conditions contrary to the common interest, such as 
by adversely affecting competitors of the undertakings benefiting from the 
aid.112 
 
6.4. Aids to Promote Culture and Heritage Conservation 
Such aids cannot be exempted if they affect trading conditions and compe-
tition to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.113 
 
6.5. Other Categories 
The Council is empowered to exempt categories of aid by decision. The 
main category comprises aid to the shipbuilding industry. The Council in 
turn has empowered the Commission to declare by regulation that the fol-
lowing categories of State aid are compatible with the common market un-
der conditions that the Commission is to define: aid in favour of small and 
                                                
108BLUMANN, pp. 84-86. 
109Case 84/82 Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 1451 at 1505 (Advocate Gen-
eral Slynn). 
110Case 323/82 Intermills SA v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 39; 
Cases T-126/96 and T-127/96 Breda Fucine Meridionali and another v Commis-
sion [1998] ECR II-3437, paragraphs 98-102 and the cases cited there. 
111Essentially the same condition appears in the last sentence of Article 86(2) of 
the Treaty. 
112Case 47/69 France v Commission [1970] ECR 487 at 496. 
113Art. 87(3) lit. d of the Treaty. 
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medium-sized enterprises; research and development; environmental pro-
tection; employment and training; aid that complies with the map approved 
by the Commission for each Member State for the grant of regional aid.114 
The Commission has published a framework for training aid and regulations 
on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid and 
aid to small and medium-sized enterprises.115 
 
7. Procedural Rules 
Article 88 of the EC Treaty contains rudimentary rules for supervising and 
dealing with State aids. Those rules were intended to be supplemented by 
more detailed rules to adopted by the Council under Article 89.116 In the 
event, no rules were adopted by the Council and the gap was progressively 
filled by various decisions of the ECJ. In 1998, the Council adopted a regu-
lation empowering the Commission to declare certain categories of aid to 
be compatible with the common market and to define a de minimis rule for 
State aids, laying down the procedure to be followed to that end.117 In 1999, 
the Council eventually adopted a body of procedural rules applying more 
generally to the supervision of State aids that, in its essentials, reflects the 
case law that had grown up in the meantime.118 
 
7.1. Procedural Regulation 
The Regulation No. 659/1999 aims at increasing transparency and legal 
certainty by the codification and clarification of the procedural rules devel-
oped through the Commission’s practice and the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice. The regulation deals in particular with the following matters: noti-
fication, standstill (suspension of the effects of a notified aid), preliminary 
evaluation, requests for information, hearing, decisions, interim measures, 
recovery of unlawful aids, reporting obligations, monitoring powers, co-op-
eration with national independent supervisory bodies and third party rights. 
 
                                                
114Council Regulation No. 994/98 (O.J. 1998 No. L142/1), Article 1(1). 
115O.J. 1998 No. C343/10, O.J. 2000 No. C89/8 and 15. 
116ROUAM, p. 108, HANCHER, pp. 134-150. 
117See II.3.3., Council Regulation No. 994/98 (O.J. 1998 No. L142/1), Council 
Regulation No. 69/2001 (O.J. 2001 No. L 10/30). 
118Council Regulation No. 659/1999 (O.J. 1999 No. L83/1). 
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7.2. Notification 
According to Article 88(1) of the Treaty, the Commission must keep all ex-
isting State aids under constant review, including those authorised by the 
Commission, due to increasing integration and the changing environment of 
the Community.119 Any plans to grant or alter aid prohibited under Article 
87(1) and not authorised under Article 87(2) or a de minimis facility120 or 
any general aid scheme or guideline of the Commission have to be notified 
to the Commission according to Article 88(3).121 Notification shall take place 
in due time, i.e. at least two months or, as the case may be, 30 days before 
the projected entry into force, and no payments shall be made in violation 
of Article 88(3).122 Questionnaires specify the information which the Com-
mission deems necessary for examining aids.123 The Commission consid-
ers a notification compulsory even where the exceptions under Article 87(2) 
are fulfilled.124 Failure to notify can lead to an action by the Commission 
under Article 226125 or by individuals before national requesting the recov-
ery of the illegal aid.126 
 
7.3. Aids Put Into Effect Without Prior Notification 
Article 1(f) of Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the appli-
cation of Article 88127 provides that a new aid is unlawful if it is put into ef-
fect in contravention of Article 88(3), i.e., without prior notification. The pro-
hibition on implementation contained in the last sentence of Article 88(3) 
has a direct effect and gives rise to rights of individuals, which national 
                                                
119SOUKUP, p. 254. 
120Community notice on the de minimis rule for State aid (O.J. 1996 No. C68/9). 
121Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, Commission’s Volume 
II.A, p. 64. 
122Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, Commission’s Volume 
II.A, p. 59. 
123Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, Commission’s Volume 
II.A, pp. 25 and 65. 
124Case 169/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 1603. 
125Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, Commission’s Volume 
II.A, pp. 40-43. 
126However, the national court may consult the Commission, which must supply the 
necessary information on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid; the mere 
absence of notification does not suffice: Case C-301/87 France v Commission 
[1990] ECR I-307, paragraphs 19-21; Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-
3547, paragraph 43. 
127O.J. 1999 No. L83/1. 
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courts are bound to safeguard.128 In addition, the Commission may, after 
giving the Member State concerned the opportunity to submit its comments, 
adopt a decision requiring the Member State to suspend any unlawful aid 
until the Commission has taken a decision on the compatibility of the aid 
with the Common Market.129 Where the Commission declares the unlawful 
aid incompatible with the Common Market, it may request the Member 
State concerned to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the 
beneficiary, in accordance with the procedures under the national law of the 
Member State concerned.130 
 
7.4. First Phase of Assessment 
The Commission must complete its initial assessment131 within a period of 
two months as required by the Court of Justice.132 This first assessment 
may result in the compatibility133 of the aids or, in case of serious doubts 
about its compatibility,134 in the initiation of the procedure135 to enjoin the 
                                                
128KEPPENE, p. 239. A national court may state the nullity of an unlawful state aid 
even if it is subsequently notified to the Commission and declared compatible, 
however without retroactive effect: Case C-354/90 Fédération nationale du com-
merce extérieur des produits alimentaires v France [1991] ECR I-5505; Case C-
39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547. 
129Article 11 of Regulation 659/1999, formalising the Commission’s practice as 
confirmed by the Court of Justice: Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] 
ECR I-307, paragraph 19. Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, 
Commission’s Volume II.A, p. 25, points 55-72. 
130Article 14 of Regulation 659/1999. 
131This does not necessarily include the hearing of complaints: Case C-367/95 
Commission v Sytraval [1998] ECR I-1719; MARTIN-EHLERS, pp. 245-248. 
132Case 84/82 Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 1451, paragraph 11; Case C-
225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraphs 33-39. If the Commis-
sion fails to take a decision within two months following the notification (provided 
the notification is complete) the Member State may, after having informed the 
Commission, put the aid into effect: Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 
1471, paragraphs 4-5; Case C-312/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-4117, 
paragraph 18. However, the two months may be extended by mutual agreement 
between the Commission and the Member State concerned. An accelerated pro-
cedure applies for the clearance of State aids for small and medium-sized enter-
prises: Commissions letter to Member States of April 27, 1989, Commission’s Vol-
ume II.A, p. 104 and – with regard to employment aid – O.J. 1995 No. C334/4, 
point 26 (twenty days). 
133Clearances of State aid in the first phase are published in the Annual Reports on 
Competition Policy. 
134The Commission is, in case of serious doubts, obliged to initiate proceedings: 
Case C-367/95 Commission v Sytraval [1998] ECR I-1719. 
135Article 88(3). In the Commission’s practice the second phase is initiated in about 
10% of the cases. This percentage corresponds roughly to the proportion of 
merger cases in which the Commission initiates, because of serious doubts, the 
second phase of procedure. 
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aids from entering into effect.136 In the event that the Commission fails to 
take one of these decisions within the two-month period, the state aid is 
automatically approved137 and the Commission is prevented from acting 
against such aid.138 The non-initiation of proceedings is therefore an act 
having direct effect and may be appealed.139 
 
7.5. Second Phase of Assessment 
After the initiation of proceedings, the Commission informs the Member 
States and other interested parties by issuing a notice in the Official Jour-
nal. The Commission may proceed (on the basis of its powers under Arti-
cles 211 and 284) with the necessary investigation by addressing requests 
for information to Member States, enterprises or associations, including 
competitors.140 It may also hear from interested Member States, third par-
ties and complainants, without, however, any legal obligation to do so. 
However, this does not release the Commission from the duty to examine 
complaints carefully and to proceed to a thorough market analysis.141 
 
7.6. Decision of the Commission and Appeals 
A decision stating that the notified aid is compatible with the Common Mar-
ket in the sense of Article 88(3)142 or justified under Article 86(2)143 may be 
appealed by other Member States or third persons, provided they are di-
                                                
136Case 171/83 Commission v France [1983] ECR 2621. 
137Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 1471; Case 171/83 Commission v 
France [1983] ECR 2621; Case 84/82 Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 1451. 
138Case C-312/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-4117. 
139Case C-312/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-4117; Case C-198/91 Cook v 
Commission [1993] ECR I-2487; Case C-313/90 CIRFS v Commission [1993] ECR 
I-1125; Case T-447/93 AITEC [1995] ECR II-1971. 
140BAST/BLANK, pp. 181-192. 
141Hearing of complaints: Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203. 
Hearing of Member States: Case T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc and 
others v Commission [1998] ECR II-2405, paragraphs 75-77. The fact that a com-
plainant participated actively during the Commission proceedings may be a deci-
sive factor for the admissibility of the complainant’s appeal: Case T-380/94 
AIUFFASS v Commission [1996] ECR II-2169. Hearing of unions: Case T-189/97 
Comité d’entreprise de la société française de production v Commission [1998] 
ECR II-335. 
142Case T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc and others v Commission 
[1998] ECR II-2405. The State aid may be authorised by the Commission even if 
that aid has already been paid before the decision was adopted. 
143Case C-348/92 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-673, paragraph 21; Case T-
106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229. 
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rectly and individually concerned.144 If the Commission finds that the aid is 
incompatible, it orders the state concerned to abolish or alter such aid 
within a period of time to be determined by the Commission. The Member 
States concerned may appeal the decision (Article 230(1)) which is en-
forceable unless the Court of Justice issues interim measures according to 
Article 243.145 If the State concerned does not comply with the Commission 
decision, the Commission or any other interested state may, in derogation 
of Article 226 and 227, refer the matter of the Court of Justice directly.146 
The recipient of the aid can invoke the principle of good faith147 only where 
he could have had a legitimate expectation that the aid was granted in ac-
cordance with the procedure laid down in Article 88.148 The non-recovery of 
the illegally granted aid by the Member States constitutes a further violation 
of the Treaty149 and the Commission may oppose the exemption of a new 
aid.150 An illegally granted State aid has to be refunded, even if this would 
lead to the bankruptcy of the company in question151 except in cases of 
absolute impossibility.152 A negative decision of the Commission can be 
                                                
144Article 230(2). However, a third party having a legitimate interest is not directly 
and individually concerned yet: Case 323/82 Intermills SA v Commission [1984] 
ECR 3809; Case C-295/92 Landbouwschap v Commission [1992] ECR I-5003; 
Case T-189/97 Comité d’entreprise de la société française de production v Com-
mission [1998] ECR II-335. Competitors may (successfully) appeal the authorisa-
tion of State aid: Case T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc and others v 
Commission [1998] ECR II-2405, paragraph 58 (lack of sufficient reasoning). Un-
der Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty third persons do not have the same rights of 
appeal: Case T-70/97 Region Wallone v Commission Case T-371/94 and T-394/94 
[1997] ECR II-1513, paragraph 24. 
145Appeals of individuals are brought before the Tribunal of First Instance whereas 
appeals of Member States have to be addressed to the Court of Justice. Case 
169/84 COFAZ v Commission [1986] ECR 391; Case C-174/94 France v Commis-
sion [1984] ECR I-5229; Case C-367/95 Commission v Sytraval [1998] ECR I-
1719, paragraph 52. 
146If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied 
with its judgement, it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment according to the 
new provision of Article 228(2)(2) as amended by the Maastricht Treaty. The 
Commission issued guidelines on the calculation of such lump sum: Commission 
notice on the method of setting penalty payments, O.J. 1997 No. C63/2. 
147AZIZI, pp. 88-139. 
148Case C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland GmbH [1997] ECR I-
1591, paragraphs 25 and 43; Twenty-seventh Report on Competition Policy, points 
311-314. 
149Case 52/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89, paragraph 14; Case C-
348/93 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-673, paragraphs 24-30. 
150Case C-355/95 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Commission [1997] ECR 
I-2549, paragraphs 24-28. 
151Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263; 27th Report on Competi-
tion Policy, point 314. 
152Case 52/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89, paragraph 14. The absolute 
impossibility must be invoked (and proved) by the beneficiary before the national 
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overruled by the Council at the request of a Member State in exceptional 
circumstances (Article 88(2)(3) and (4)).153 
 
7.7. Cooperation Between Commission and National Courts154 
National Courts which have to decide on the legal consequences, including 
interim measures, against a non-notified aid or an aid declared incompati-
ble by the Commission may request assistance and information from the 
Commission in accordance with the Notice on the cooperation between 
Commission and national courts.155 
 
8. The Consequences of Illegality 
The primary consequence of the unlawfulness of a State aid is that it must 
cease to be paid and, where it is new aid granted without prior notification 
to the Commission, any past payments of aid will be clawed back from the 
recipient either by virtue of a recovery injunction ordered by the Commis-
sion or by virtue of an order made by a national Court, subject to any de-
fence that the recipient of the aid may have.156 A Commission decision 
(whether a recovery injunction or a recovery order) is challengeable before 
the CFI by the recipient of the aid. A failure to do so within time will pre-
clude the recipient from disputing the lawfulness of the Commission deci-
sion in national proceedings brought against the recipient in implementation 
of the decision.157 
 
A further consequence of illegality of an aid is that the validity of the legisla-
tive or administrative provisions giving effect to the aid may be im-
                                                                                                                          
authorities or Courts: Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing Ltd. v Commission [1998] 
ECR II-1, but not by the Member State having granted the illegal aid: Case C-
280/95 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-259. See II.8. for further comments about 
illegality. 
153This possibility has been used only in the agricultural sector; 22nd on Competi-
tion Policy, point 502. 
154HAZARD, pp. 145-149. 
155O.J. 1995 No. C312/8; Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547. 
156LONG, pp. 389-393. 
157Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [1994] ECR I-833. 
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pugned.158 However, it is not clear how far that goes because the general 
principle is that, where domestic measures are incompatible with Commu-
nity law, the result is not that the former are non-existent but that they must 
be disapplied in the individual case in order to give effect to rights derived 
by individual from Community law.159 Accordingly, it does not appear that, 
where a State aid is illegal, the domestic legislative or administrative provi-
sions giving effect to it are void or voidable in the technical sense. 
 
In addition to the recovery of illegally granted aid, a further consequence of 
unlawfulness is that the State granting the aid may be liable in damages for 
the loss caused to competitors of the beneficiaries of the aid as a result of 
the illegal grant of the aid.160 So far, no successful actions for damages ap-
pear to have been brought. Where the competitors injured by the grant of 
the aid are located, one of the main stumbling blocks to the recovery of 
damages has been thought to be the problem of causation. That problem 
was particularly acute in cases where the currencies of the States con-
cerned did not operate at fixed parities during the relevant period. That diffi-
culty, at least, no longer applies as between States within the Euro zone. 
 
Community law provides no basis for rendering the recipient of unlawful 
State aid liable in damages to a person injured by the grant of the aid;161 
but that is without prejudice to the possibility that national law may provide 
such a remedy.162 In principle, damages may also be claimed against the 
Community should one of its institutions act unlawfully in the application of 
the State aid rules and thereby cause damage to a person; however, liabil-
ity is not easy to establish.163 
 
                                                
158E.g. Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 40, where 
the ECJ said that ”national Courts must offer to individuals the certain prospect that 
all the appropriate conclusions will be drawn from an infringement of the last sen-
tence of Article 88(3) of the Treaty, in accordance with their national law, as re-
2/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl and oth-
tary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029. 
gards the validity of measures giving effect to the aid”. 
159Cases C-10/97 to C-2
ers [1998] ECR I-6307. 
160Liability arises under the general principle of State liability for breach of Commu-
nity law: Cases C-46 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur v Germany and R Secre-
161ABBAMONTE, pp. 87-93. 
162Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraphs 73-76. 
163E.g. Case T-230/95 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande v Commission [1999] ECR II-
123. See also, BARTH, p. 290, CROZIER, p. 162. 
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III. Nature of Sectoral Aid 
1. General 
In this chapter the policy statements by the Commission on sectoral aid in 
general and their application shall be discussed.164 In Chapter II.6. the 
broad context of Article 87(3) as well as certain categories and types of aid 
have been dealt with. 
 
The Commission’s policy statements on sectoral aid were basically formu-
lated in the 1970s. Because the Commission’s sectoral interventions are 
still based on these principles, a discussion of these statements, in particu-
lar the 1978 communication, is useful. Nowadays the Commission sectoral 
actions are increasingly governed by specific guidelines. Two further sector 
specific guidelines have been published, for air and maritime transport, and 
also other guidelines have been updated.165 Furthermore, additional guide-
lines for certain categories and types of aid have been adopted. Particularly 
important in this respect is the multisectoral framework on regional aid for 
large investment projects.166 The first assessment criterion of this frame-
work relating to structural overcapacity basically replaces the relevant pas-
sage of the 1978 communication.167 
 
The numerous new sectoral frameworks and other guidelines, such as the 
guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, raise 
the question whether it would be better to adopt a general regime applica-
ble to all sectors with a specification per different sector. Such an approach 
would also be in line with the transparency objectives advanced by Regula-
tion 994/98 on block exemptions. 
 
 
2. The Period Prior to Publication of the Com-
                                                
164See on this topic in general ROSENSTOCK, chapter 4.1.2; EVANS, chapter 5. 
165GREAVES, pp. 144-149. 
166O.J. 1998 No. C107/7. 
167In as far as the aid proposals are within the scope of the framework. 
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mission’s Communication 
mmission had 
published several general statements on its policy on sectoral aid. Thus the 
ompetition Policy contains a lengthy paragraph in which 
numerates criteria that should ensure that aid does mini-
ature and only granted to enterprises or to produc-
tions, the development and reorganisation of which justifies the pre-
 long run, unreasonable protection of 
sectors facing difficulties. Aid systems must therefore avoid preventing 
 the Community institutions may easily 
evaluate their incidence and effectiveness with regard to the aims to be 
attained, in order that the public authorities may be in a position to 
ses 
concerned may assess the true situation; 
Prior to the publication of its communication in 1978, the Co
First Report on C
the Commission e
mal harm to competition and has a maximum of effectiveness with regard 
to the balanced development of the Community. Aid must: 
 
 be of a selective n
sumption that they will be competitive in the long run, having regard to 
the expected development of the sector concerned; 
 
 be of sufficiently temporary or even digressive nature in order to stimu-
late the dynamism of beneficiaries. It must foster the necessary adapta-
tions and make it clear to the parties concerned that the artificial situa-
tion arising from the granting of aid cannot continue indefinitely. Unless 
aid is intended to compensate for distortions of competition at Commu-
nity level, which are created by measures adopted in non-Member 
countries, purely conservatory aid outside reorganisation programmes 
and aid for the operation of plants must be excluded. Economic and so-
cial progress cannot allow, in the
the optimum allocation of production factors indefinitely. They must ei-
ther speed up structural changes or only slow down such changes tem-
porarily, and this only until the necessary reconversion solutions have 
been found; 
 
 be as possible, in order that
measure accurately the cost involved, and in order that the enterpri
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 be of a form well adapted to the objectives in view and, in so far as a 
choice between various methods is possible, adopt those that have the 
rts with a refer-
nce to Article 3(g) of the Treaty, the need to ensure that competition in the 
s could unilaterally 
circumvent its requirements by granting aid; 
e social cost; 
ii) intensify competition to such an extent that it could destroy itself. 
least effect on intra-Community trade and the common interest.168 
 
3. The Commission’s Communication on Sec-
toral Aid169 
The Commission, in describing the general principles, sta
e
common market is not distorted. It then sets out three reasons to justify ad-
herence to this principle: 
 
(i) the customs union would founder if Member State
(ii) the common market makes little sense unless businesses tackle the 
market on the strength of their own resources without any aid to distort 
competition between them; 
(iii) lastly, and as a corollary, a system which leaves the field open to com-
petition provides for optimum distribution of production factors and en-
sures the most rapid economic and social progress. 
 
Nevertheless, aid may be justified where it contributes to the achievement 
of the Community’s economic and social aims. This occurs when market 
forces would: 
 
(i) obstruct progress towards the realisation of these aims; 
(ii) permit them to be attained only within unacceptable time-limits or at 
unacceptabl
(i
 
The Commission considers that sectoral aid should be authorised where it 
is needed to correct serious regional imbalance, to encourage or accelerate 
certain essential changes or developments in certain industries, to permit 
                                                
1681st Report on Competition Policy, pt 165. 
169COM(78) 221 final – May 1978, Competition law in the European Communities, 
Vol. II: Rules applicable to State aids (Commission of the European Communities, 
Brussels, 1990), p. 39; 8th Report on Competition Policy. 
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smooth cutbacks in certain activities where this is desireable for social rea-
sons or to neutralise, at least temporarily, certain distortions of competition 
due to action outside the Community. 
 
The aims, forms and conditions relating to such aids, justifiable in  that th
facilitate the orderly development of Community structures, must not c
flict with the Commun
ey 
on-
ity’s general objectives and must be designed in such 
 which it examines the sectoral aid proposals noti-
ed to it. The main criteria are the following: 
(i) re it is justified by circum-
(ii) 
 the status quo and putting off decisions 
(iii) 
 admissible in cer-
tain circumstances and subject to strict conditions; 
) the intensity of aid should be proportionate to the problem it is de-
kept to a mini-
(vi) employment should not be transferred from 
                                                
a way as to entail a minimum distortion of competition. 
 
On the basis of these general principles the Commission has developed a 
number of criteria against
fi
 
sectoral aid should be limited to cases whe
stances in the industry concerned; 
aid should lead to a restoration of long-term viability by resolving prob-
lems rather than preserving
and changes which are inevitable; 
nevertheless, since adjustment takes time, a limited use of resources 
to reduce the social and economic costs of change is
(iv) unless granted over relatively short periods, aids should be reduced 
progressively and clearly linked to the restructuring of the sector con-
cerned; 
(v
signed to resolve so that distortions of competition are 
mum170; and 
industrial problems and un
one Member State to another. 
 
The Commission does not consider it advisable to define systematically the 
types of aid to which it is favourably and unfavourably disposed in the case 
of each industrial sector. To elaborate such guidelines for aid would risk 
irement is the anti-cumulation rule. In 170Closely related to the proportionality requ
1987 the Commission opened the Art. 88(2) procedure against France and Greece 
because it could not assess what the effects of cumulation might be, O.J. 1987 No. 
C300/4. 
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encouraging a more general recourse to aid by Member States even where 
it is not strictly necessary. It would, moreover, result in some degree of in-
flexibility, since such frameworks could not take into account the specific 
ituation of the industry concerned in each Member State. However, in 
n’s approach in the 
ase of such industries has been based on certain common principles. It 
r a series of interventions by 
ember States designed to protect their industries. In the latter eventuality, 
Member State to another at substantial cost to the Community as a whole. 
to a
tion of the industries’ competitiveness. To these ends it has accepted aids 
quir
und uction in production 
 
In more concrete terms, this has led to the specification of the following 
 
(i) t be granted where the sole effect would be to maintain 
nted for a limited period and are condi-
tional on action by the recipient, which will facilitate adjustment; 
ductions in capacity and should therefore be limited to cases where 
s
cases where it has become evident that an industry faces a situation of 
particular difficulty throughout the Community, or is likely to face such diffi-
culty, it is appropriate to develop guidelines which indicate the Commis-
sion’s policy on aids to this industry. The Commissio
c
has recognised that the crises the specific industry has met have threat-
ened either a disorderly rundown of their activities with serious adverse 
consequences for employment in general o
M
aid levels would be uselessly inflated and difficulties transferred from one 
The purpose of the Commission’s initiatives in defining guidelines has been 
void both eventualities and at the same time to encourage the restora-
to enable orderly adjustment to market conditions. Such adjustment re-
es both a restoration of competitiveness and either an avoidance of 
esirable increases or, in some cases, an actual red
capacity. 
principles: 
aid should no
the status quo. Production aids as such are therefore in principle im-
permissible unless they are gra
(ii) similarly, while rescue measures may be needed in order to provide a 
breathing space during which longer-term solutions to a company’s dif-
ficulties can be worked out, they should not frustrate any necessary re-
they are required to cope with acute social problems; and 
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(iii) since it is a common feature of the industries concerned that capacity 
is excessive, aid should not be given to investment projects which 
would result in capacity being increased. 
 
In the case of certain industries, particularly those which are in difficulties, 
the Commission has sought either to ensure that these and other types of 
aid respect the same criteria or that they are only granted on certain condi-
tions. Thus, where employment aids are given to maintain existing jobs, the 
Commission has considered that if they are concentrated on industrial sec-
tors which face acute difficulties in all Member States and if they are not 
associated with appropriate adjustment measures designed to restore a 
company’s viability, the grant of these aids will not resolve the social and 
industrial difficulties but will rather transfer them to other Member States. 
Similarly, in sectors suffering from extreme overcapacity the Commission 
has required Member States to agree in principle not to grant regional aids 
for investment projects that would result in increased capacity. A principle 
not specifically mentioned is the prohibition of operating aid. The Commis-
sion has always opposed such aid. 
 
4. The Multisectoral Framework on Regional 
Aid for Large Investment Projects 
This framework entered into force on September 1st , 1998. Although its title 
ectoral implications. In its 27th Report on Competition Policy the 
ommission explains that the objectives of the framework, to stem the 
jecti
fram
dustrial sectors, agriculture, fisheries, steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibres, 
and
fram
pos
                                                
suggest that these rules are intended for regional aid, it has nevertheless 
important s
C
amount of aid for large regional projects, also serves the more general ob-
ve of aligning the divergent rules per sector.171 In paragraph 1.3 of the 
ework the Commission notes that the special rules for the sensitive in-
the motor industry, transport and coal, will remain applicable. The textile 
 clothing sector will, however, be subject solely to the provisions of this 
ework. The framework introduces a specific notification format for pro-
als to award regional investment aid within the scope of an approved 
17127th Report on Competition Policy, pt 210. 
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scheme. The annex to the framework provides for an standard notification 
. The framework applies to: form
 
) all proposals with a total project cost of at least 50 million EUR with a 
itude to sectoral aid schemes has been 
demonstrated in numerous decisions in the past. This may be the rea-
94. 
sectors such 
                                                
(i
cumulative aid intensity of at least 50 percent and aid per job of at least 
40'000 EUR; 
(ii) proposals for which the total aid is at least 50 million EUR. 
 
As a result of these rules, the framework will be applicable to all sectoral 
aid not covered by sector specific frameworks except textile and clothing. 
 
5. The Application of the General Sectoral Prin-
ciples 
The Commission’s view on sectoral aid is clearly expressed in its 26th Re-
port on Competition Policy: 
 
”The Commission’s negative att
son why few such schemes were drawn up by Member States in 19
However, the increased number of ad hoc aid cases in favour of indi-
vidual undertakings, many of them concentrated in certain 
as mechanical engineering, paper, foundry products and agricultural, is 
worrying. In its decisions on the compatibility of such aid cases, the 
Commission must take into account the sectoral consequences of the 
aid, particularly in sectors suffering from overcapacity.”172 
 
The application of the 1978 Communication has been limited because the 
most depressed sectors have all been the subject of specific Commission 
frameworks, communications or notices. The application of general princi-
ples on sectoral aid has been limited because important aid proposals in-
creasingly involve large industrial conglomerates. Such aid proposals can-
not easily be assessed in the context of one particular sector. The aid 
granted by Italy to Enirisorse constitutes a good example of such an aid 
17226th Report on Competition Policy, pt 363. 
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proposal.173 The non-operating holding company Enirisorse was optimising 
the economic and financial resources of the ENI group, which in turn con-
isted of the following industrial activities: mining of non-ferrous metals, 
inor
on a uring when it approved a 809 billion lire recapitalisation 
opened the 
rticle 88(2) procedure because the Italian government had not fulfilled an 
n 
dopted a decision ordering the Italian government recovery due to the fact 
 
s given to the guidelines on state aid for rescu-
g and restructuring rather than to the sectoral guidelines. In a number of 
the 
crite
 
Sev
plan
In o
the 
eligi
ferre  Competition 
olicy. 
s
coal mining, coke production, metallurgy of non-ferrous metals and, finally, 
ganic chemistry. In its decision the Commission followed its guidelines 
id for restruct
plan for the entire conglomerate. A year later the Commission re
A
important condition. In addition it had made fresh capital injections and was 
planning further injections.174 On November 26, 1998, the Commissio
a
that the latest recapitalisation by ENI did not offer sufficient financial return
since Enirisorse was soon to be wound up.175 
 
As this example shows, conglomeration in the industry has the effect that 
more and more application i
in
Commission’s decisions involving sectoral aid, it specifically applied the 
ria laid down in its 1978 communication. 
eral Commission decisions analyse whether adequate restructuring 
s had been drafted and whether the overcapacity was being tackled.176 
ne instance the Commission also noted that the aid was used to reduce 
social and economic costs of change as well as for job creation in areas 
ble for regional aid. In one decision the Commission specifically re-
d to its summary of its communication in the 8th Report on
P
 
With one exception, the Annual Reports on Competition Policy do not dis-
cuss the Commission’s communication. The 13th Report mentions three 
                                                
173O.J. 1998 No. L80/32. 
174O.J. 1998 No. C70/5. The Commission’s action was taken pursuant to the recep-
tion which was to be submitted as one of the conditions of the previous apporval 
decision. 
175Agence Europe, November 27, 1998. 
176O.J. 1990 No. L47/28; O.J. 1989 No. L356/22; O.J. 1992 No. 159/46. A more 
recent example is the Commission’s decision approving the aid to Esmaltaciones 
San Ignacio, where it concluded that the length of the proposed guarantee of 
portionate, O.J. 1993 No. C277/5. seven years appears to be necessary and pro
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particular problems in the examination of individual aid cases: aids to res-
cue firms in difficulties, the problems of defining the degree of restructuring 
which can be regarded as constituting ”a compensatory Community inter-
est” for the granting of aid, and the concept of innovation. The Commission 
notes that government actions to rescue firms in difficulties may easily lead 
to the transfer of industrial difficulties and unemployment to other Member 
States. On the question of defining the necessary degree of restructuring, 
the Commission expresses the opinion that evidence must be provided that 
the changes being proposed are sufficient to ensure medium- to long-term 
viability of the enterprises without aids. The third problem is the growing 
tendency to present as restructuring what is in fact simple ongoing mod-
ernisation and renewal of production facilities. For the control of State aid it 
is important to recognise the difference between innovation (i.e. the intro-
uction of new products or new production technologies) and the steady d
development of existing products and production technologies.177 
 
                                                
17713th Report on Competition Policy, pt 229 and pt 230. 
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IV. State Aid to the Motor Vehi-
cle Industry 
1. Background 
The motor vehicle industry is of strategic importance to the Community. 
Many areas of Community policy have a direct bearing on the motor vehicle 
sector. It is estimated that 10 percent of the Community’s employment is 
dependent on it.178 The industry has become a world-wide one and the fu-
ture viability of the European motor vehicle sector will, in part, be deter-
mined by its ability to compete and sell on the world markets. 
 
However, as the Commission noted in its communication f o July 19, 
996,179 production capacity utilisation rates among most of the major 
European manufacturers has been below 80 percent since 1993 and is 
unlikely to improve significantly over the medium term. Overreliance on 
State aid to solve problems of industrial competitiveness vis-à-vis third 
country producers hinders the economically healthy influence of market 
forces and undermines the competitiveness of Community car manufactur-
ing. At the international level, the agreements signed or in the process of 
being signed with the countries of central and eastern Europe allow the 
Commission to investigate the conditions under which State aid is granted 
outside the Union. Thus, in its 1996 Competition Policy Report, the Com-
mission indicated that the Daewoo and General Motors cases are being 
studied in co-operation with the Polish authorities.180 
 
In the period 1970-1989, the governments of several Member States in-
jected massive amounts of aid into the modernisation and development, 
and indeed the survival, of their domestic car industry.181 For instance, in 
the period 1977-1987, State aid to the motor vehicle industry, essentially in 
                                                
1
178Community framework on State aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry, O.J. 1989 No. 
C123/3, paragraph 1. 
179COM (96) 327 final. 
18026th Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 190. 
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the form of capital injections or extensive debt write-offs, is estimated at 26 
in the motor vehicle sector 
and bearing in mind that all manufacturers are entitled to a consistent ap-
the Treaty, the Commission decided to introduce, 
s” on the basis of Article 88(1),182 a Community 
(under Article 
8(3)) of all significant cases of aid to the motor vehicle sector, irrespective 
billion EUR. 
 
In view of the growing sensitivity of competition 
proach compatible with 
as ”appropriate measure
framework on State aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry (the ”1989 Frame-
work”),183 discussed in detail below. Such proposed ”appropriate measures” 
are ”simple recommendations” within the meaning of Article 249 of the EC 
Treaty,184 though they must be reasoned.185 
 
In summary, the 1989 framework envisaged prior notification 
8
of their objective, as well as an annual report of all aid payments including 
aid not subject to the obligation of prior notification.186 Between 1989 and 
July 1996 the Commission approved 5.4 billion EUR of aid to the indus-
try.187 
 
The 1989 framework was intended to enter into force on January 1, 1989 
and be valid for a period of two years.188 However, following its approval by 
ten of the (then) twelve Member States the application of the framework 
was delayed until January 1990 for Spain and May 1990 for Germany; 
                                                                                                                          
181Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry, O.J. 1997 No. 
C279/1, point 1(a).  
182Art. 88(1) provides that: ”The Commission shall, in co-operation with Member 
tates, keep under constant review all aid existing in those States. It shall propose 
C123/3, paragraph 2.2. 
pments” (Summer 1997) Vol. 3, No. 2, Competition Policy 
hicle Industry, O.J. 1989 No. 
C123/3, paragraph 2.5. 
S
to the latter any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or 
by the functioning of the common market.” 
183O.J. 1989 No. C123/3. 
184EVANS, p. 439; Cases 166 and 220/86 Irish Cement Ltd. v Commission [1988] 
ECR 6473, 6492. 
185Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595. 
186Community framework on State aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry, O.J. 1989 No. 
187”Summary of the most important recent developments” (Autumn/Winter 1995) 
Vol. 1, No. 6, Competition Policy Newsletter, pp. 41-47; ”Summary of the most 
important recent develo
Newsletter, pp. 48-52. 
188Community framework on State aid to the Motor Ve
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Spain and Germany had originally been opposed to its application.189 It has 
since been reviewed and renewed a number of times, i.e. in December 
990,190 December 23, 1992191 and July 5, 1995192. 
ork which concluded that the 
ramework was generally effective but recommended certain adjustments 
cided to propose it to the Member States as an appropriate meas-
re under Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty. 
1998194. 
 
1
 
2. 1997 Community Framework for State Aid to 
the Motor Vehicle Industry 
2.1. Introduction 
In 1996 the Commission, with the help of independent consultants, carried 
out an in-depth study of the 1989 Framew
F
concerning, in particular, the notification thresholds, the definition of the 
sector and the methods of carrying out the cost-benefit analysis. On the 
basis of this report, the Commission presented its new draft Community 
Framework for State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry for examination by 
the representatives of the Member States at a multilateral meeting, and 
then de
u
 
This (new) Community Framework for State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Indus-
try was published as a Notice No. 97/C279/01 on July 15, 1997 (the ”1997 
Framework”).193 The 1997 Framework entered into force on January 1, 
                                                
189Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry, O.J. 1997 No. 
tion for Germany to Berlin (West) and 
GDR). Article 1(3) of the Commission’s Decision of Feb-
ry 1, 1991. 
 industry, O.J. 1993 
id in the motor vehicle sector, O.J. 1995 No. C284/3. 
in v Commission of the European Communities [1997] ECR 
C279/1. 
190See Community framework on State aid to the motor vehicle industry, O.J. 1991 
No. C81/4. The 1990 decision renewed the 1989 framework (with a modification 
which extended the prior notification obliga
the territory of the former 
ruary 21, 1990, as published in O.J. 1990 No. L188 of July 20, 1990, is no longer 
valid as from Janua
191See Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle
No. C36/17. 
192Framework for State a
193Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry for the period 
1998-2000, O.J. 1997 No. C279/1 (the ”1997 Framework”). 
194Paragraph 2.6, 1997 Framework. However, following the outcome of Case C-
292/95 Kingdom of Spa
I-1931, this entry into force is subject to the formal consent of all Member States in 
order to be valid. 
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The 1997 Framework states that the preceding (1995) Framework, which 
entered into force on January 1, 1996, will serve as a basis for the as-
sessment of aid proposals which were notified before November 1, 1997, 
ut which have not yet been declared compatible by the Commission or are 
 
motor vehicle industry” 
, which meant that it was not cov-
red by the previous Framework and was assessable solely in the light of 
he phrase ”motor vehicles”198 encompasses passenger cars, vans, trucks, 
road tractors, buses, coaches and other commercial vehicles. It appears 
that a lorry cabin was, under the previous Framework, treated as part of the 
b
the subject of proceedings under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, initiated
before that date.195 
 
2.2. Definition of ”
The 1997 Framework defines the motor vehicle industry as meaning the 
”development, manufacture and assembly” of motor vehicles, engines for 
motor vehicles and ”modules or sub-systems” for such vehicles or engines, 
either direct by a manufacturer or by a ”first tier component supplier” and, in 
the latter case, only in the context of an ”overall project”.196 The inclusion of 
the ”development” of motor vehicles is new, compared with the 1989 
Framework. The previous exclusion for ”parts and accessories” for both 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines has been removed. In an earlier 
decision in Suzuki Manzanares197 the Commission agreed to regard the 
plant in question as a components factory
e
normal criteria applicable to regional aid. Hence the 1997 Framework may 
be regarded as tightening up its application to include the manufacture of 
components which may previously have been excluded. 
 
T
manufacture of a motor vehicle, rather than a component.199 The following 
are excluded: racing cars, vehicles intended for off-road use (e.g. vehicles 
for use on snow or carrying persons on golf courses), motorcycles, trailers, 
agricultural and forestry tractors, caravans, special purpose vehicles (e.g. 
fighting vehicles, mobile fire workshops), dump trucks, works’ trucks (e.g. 
                                                
195Paragraph 2.6, 1997 Framework. 
196Paragraph 2.1, 1997 Framework. 
19726th Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 187. 
198Paragraph 2.1(a), 1997 Framework. 
199”Commission investigates transport aid to Volvo plant”, European Report, No. 
2244 July 24, 1997 at p. 1. 
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fork-lift trucks, straddle carrier trucks and platform trucks) and military vehi-
cles. 
 
The term ”motor vehicle engines”200 means compression and spark ignition 
engines. Unlike the previous Framework, it also means electric motors and 
turbine, gas, hybrid or other engines for motor vehicles. 
a set of primary components in-
tended for a vehicle or engine which is produced, assembled or fitted by a 
agement of a sup-
ly centre. 
Spanish Government) was for the installation of more flexible machinery to 
nic modules. However, the Commission 
 
A ”module” or a ”sub-system”201 means 
first-tier component supplier and supplied through a computerised ordering 
system or on a just-in-time basis. Logistical supply and storage systems 
and subcontracted complete operations which from part of the production 
chain, such as the painting of sub-assemblies, should likewise be classified 
among these modules and sub-systems. 
 
A ”first tier component supplier”202 means a supplier, whether independent 
or not, supplying a manufacturer, sharing responsibility for designing and 
development, and manufacturing, assembling or supplying a vehicle manu-
facturer during the manufacturing or assembly stage with sub-assemblies 
or modules. Such suppliers are often linked to a manufacturer by a contract 
of approximately the same duration as the life of the model (for example, 
until the model is restyled). A first-tier component supplier may also supply 
services, especially logistical services, such as the man
p
 
The new 1997 Framework therefore broadens the definition of the industry 
to include first-tier component suppliers producing modules or subsystems 
where these are produced in the car manufacturer’s plant or on one or 
more industrial sites in the vicinity. In an earlier Commission Decision of 
April 1993 (under the previous Framework) the Commission approved aid 
to Cadiz Electronica, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Com-
pany. The aid (in the form of a regional grant of 12 million EUR from the 
rationalise production of electro
                                                
200Paragraph 2.1(b), 1997 Framework. 
201Paragraph 2.1(c), 1997 Framework. 
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chose not to apply the same strict discipline that it would have done for final 
vehicle assembly or engine production engines because this would have 
d to unfair treatment by comparison with aid to projects being undertaken 
 was far below the 
reshold for that particular region, no significant distortions of competition 
the vehicle manufacturer’s invest-
ent project. A manufacturer may, on the actual site of the investment or in 
 sub-paragraph of the Framework, ”integrated within the defini-
on of a global project” if at least half the output resulting from that invest-
le
by independent component producers which were (at that time) not notifi-
able under the Framework.203 Since the increase in capacity was restricted 
to ABS modules for use in Ford cars and since the aid
th
were to be expected.204 
 
The widening of the 1997 Framework to include certain independent com-
ponent producers may result in the Commission having a more limited flexi-
bility in similar situations in future. 
 
An ”overall project”205 lasts for the life of 
m
one of several industrial parks in fairly close geographical proximity, inte-
grate one or more projects of first-tier component suppliers for the supply of 
modules or sub-systems for the vehicles or engines being produced. The 
proximity could inter alia take the form of a fixed link (e.g. an automated 
conveyor belt) allowing the delivery of modules directly into the car factory. 
An ”overall project” means one which groups together such projects. 
 
An investment of one first-tier component supplier is, under paragraph 
2.1(e), third
ti
ment is delivered to the manufacturer concerned at the plant in question. 
 
2.3. General criteria for assessment of all forms of aid 
The criteria which the Commission uses to assess aid which falls above the 
relevant threshold varies according to the objectives of the aid in ques-
tion.206 In every instance, however, the Commission is to check that the aid 
granted is both proportional to the gravity of the problems to be resolved 
                                                                                                                          
202Paragraph 2.1(d), 1997 Framework. 
203BAYLIS, pp. 1-13. 
204Ibid. 
205Paragraph 2.1(e), 1997 Framework. 
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and is necessary for the realisation of the project. Both tests, proportionality 
and necessity must be satisfied if the Commission is to authorise State aid 
in the motor vehicle industry.207 All forms of aid are assessed on this same 
basis. (The test of necessity was not specified as one of the general criteria 
for approval of aid under the 1989 Framework). In addition to the two tests, 
specific rules of assessment are also set out in the 1997 Framework for 
eight different types of aid, namely regional aid, R&D aid, rescue and re-
structuring aid, investment aid for innovation, aid for environmental pro-
ction and energy saving, aid to vocational training, aid for modernisation 
ts. 
                                                                                                                         
te
and rationalisation, and operation aid, all discussed in detail below. 
 
3. Assessment of Regional Aid under the 1997 
Framework 
Under the terms of the 1997 Framework, the motor vehicle industry may 
benefit from regional aid to assist new plants and the extension of existing 
ones in the assisted areas (i.e. areas qualifying for domestic regional aid) of 
the Community.208 The Commission first checks that the region in question 
is eligible for aid under Community law. It is recognised that such aid 
makes a valuable contribution to regional development by creating or safe-
guarding often highly-skilled jobs and through significant indirect effec
 
Prior notification of the proposed aid allows the Commission to compare the 
advantages from the standpoint of regional development with any unfa-
vourable consequences for the sector as a whole209 in order to ensure that 
all relevant factors are taken into consideration. 
 
 
3.1. Illustration of Commission Practice Balancing Regional and Sectoral 
Aid 
For example, in relation to aid for Ford and Volkswagen to establish a car 
factory in the Setubal peninsula in Portugal, the Commission considered 
 
 Framework. 
raph 3.2, 1997 Framework. 
 a plant in the Mezzogiorno, O.J. 1991 No. 
C299/4. 
206Paragraph 3, 1997 Framework. 
207Paragraph 3, 1997
208Parag
209See, e.g., the Case of aid to Fiat for
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factors such as the economic development of the region concerned, the 
particular situation of the car industry, and the specific situation of ”mono-
space” (multi-purpose) vehicles for which there was a growing demand, 
and came to a conclusion that the aid was permissible.210 Similarly, in as-
sessing a French proposal to grant aid to Saab-Scania for building a new 
heavy trucks/goods vehicle manufacturing plant at Angers, the Commission 
analysed the possible effects of the aid on the industry as a whole and took 
particular account of the problems of declining demand and overcapacity in 
the Community for heavy trucks. However, in view of the expected rise in 
demand in 1993, the Commission considered that a concentration of the 
id on the later stages of the project would reduce its distorting effect on 
l-
to 
utweigh the regional benefits to a disadvantaged area as the project in-
 proposal by the Spanish 
overnment to grant regional aid to FASA Renault (a subsidiary of the 
enault Group in Spain) in support of its plan to locate an entirely new pet-
out in the 1989 Frame-
a
competition and avoid exacerbating the relevant industry’s current difficu
ties.211 
 
The Commission may also reduce the aid intensity in order to take account 
of these various considerations. In the Angers case, the Commission sub-
sequently opened proceedings under Article 88(2) when it learned that the 
aid was to be used for purposes different from those originally agreed.212 
Regional aid was also approved in favour of General Motors in Luxembourg 
for the setting-up of a new research and development centre on the basis 
that the aid would not have adverse effects on the industry sufficient 
o
volved a transfer of technology to which all European manufacturers would 
have access.213 
 
In October 1994, the Commission approved a
G
R
rol engine plant at Valladolid (Spain). The Commission stated that the pro-
ject complied with the criteria for regional aid set 
work and took account of the possible adverse effects on the sector as a 
                                                
210EVANS, p. 316, citing Decision at O.J. 1991 No. C257/5. This Decision was un-
successfully challenged before the ECJ in Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission 
20th Report on Competition 
 Report on Competition Policy, p. 161. 
[1993] ECR I-3203. 
211EVANS, p. 317, citing O.J. 1991 No. C160/4. See also 
Policy, pp. 160-161. 
212EVANS, p. 317, citing Notice C5/96 (NN138/95), O.J. 1996 No. C84/5. 
213EVANS, p. 317, citing 20th
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whole. However, it concluded that the project would not contribute to over-
capacity in the sector because there were planned reductions in capacity in 
other plants of the company in Europe.214 In March 1995, the Commission 
decided not to oppose aid which the U.K. Government granted to Jaguar 
Cars Ltd in support of an investment project. The aid was in two parts: a 
£9.4 million regional assistance grant and a £1.8 million training grant (the 
latter was found not to be a State aid). The purpose of the aid was to found 
the launch of the new X100 sports car, the replacement to the XJS. The 
Commission decided that the aid was not disproportionate, in view of the 
structural handicaps of the relevant regions, i.e. Birmingham, Coventry and 
Liverpool, and since it did not lead to any increases in capacity at group 
level, it was acceptable even though it was slightly in excess of the usual 
permitted regional aid.215 
ect in the sole plant available, even in the absence of aid. 
hus the existence of a viable alternative location confirms the ”mobility” of 
 
3.2. Test of Necessity/Mobility of Regional Aid 
Regional aid for the motorvehicle industry will not be approved by the Com-
mission unless, first, the test of necessity and/or mobility is satisfied.216 In 
order to demonstrate the necessity for regional aid, the aid recipient must 
clearly prove that it has an economically viable alternative location for its 
project or subpart(s) of a project.217 Otherwise, if there were no other in-
dustrial site, whether new or in existence, capable of receiving the invest-
ment in question within the group, the undertaking would be compelled to 
carry out its proj
T
the project. 
 
However, mobility alone is not always sufficient to establish the necessity 
for aid. For example, the site chosen may have net competitive advantages 
in comparison with the alternative proposed by the investor.218 
 
                                                
214BAYLIS, pp. 1-13 at p. 8. 
7-522. 
215BAYLIS, pp. 1-13. 
216ERLBACHER, pp. 51
217Paragraph 3.2(a), 1997 Framework. 
218Paragraph 3.2(a), n. 20, 1997 Framework. 
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The Commission determines whether or not costs relating to the mobile as-
pects of a project are eligible. Eligibility is defined by the regional scheme 
applicable in the assisted region concerned.219 
Mobility of the project may be demonstrated by investors on the basis or 
studies they have carried out in order to identify the final location, which 
may not be necessarily within the Community. The Commission verifies the 
likelihood of the alternatives. No regional aid may be authorised for a pro-
ject or parts of a project that are not geographically mobile. 
 
Where the alternative location is not in the EEA or in one of the countries of 
central and eastern Europe (CEEC), an investor must prove, notably by 
means of a location study, that at least one commercially viable alternative 
to the location chosen has been considered in the EEA or CEEC.220 Other-
ise, the location chosen will be considered to be the best one (rather than 
 
s 
 Commission’s experts will then have to verify the alternative 
ircumstantial evidence, referred to above.222 
n facturer will, 
y definition, be considered mobile itself.223 A supplier’s project may be mo-
                                                
w
the essential one). 
If a complete location study was not made, the beneficiary will have to pro-
vide sufficient circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that it has actively 
pursued an alternative location which would, in the short term, have been 
more cost efficient but was not pursued for specific reasons. This provision 
is aimed, for example, at producer of component systems to be located in 
the vicinity of a vehicle plant who would normally not have made such a 
study and for whom the alternative site is thus the same as for the vehicle 
producer. A car assembler who has been in competition with other sites will 
also not have access to the location study performed by the car com-
pany.221 The
c
 
A project put forward by first-tier module or sub-system suppliers that is 
directly linked to a mobile investment by a motor vehicle ma u
b
ramework. 
1997 Framework. 
x I, 1997 Framework. 
ork. 
219Paragraph 3.2(b), 1997 F
220Paragraph 3.2(a), 
221Paragraph 3.2, n. 35, Anne
222Paragraph 3.2, Annex I, 1997 Framew
223Paragraph 3.2(a), n. 19, 1997 Framework. 
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bile even if the manufacturer’s project is not; the supplier would have to be 
able to satisfy the Commission on this point.224 
 
Regional aid intended for ”modernisation and rationalisation” is not author-
ised under the 1997 Framework for the motor vehicle industry and is gener-
ally considered not to be mobile. 
 
Sometimes, entire production lines for the manufacture of motor vehicle be-
ome obsolete and are dismantled. Such occurrences, though rare, may 
work. It is distinguishable from ”restructuring” in that it is 
pplicable to firms in financial difficulties. 
the 
227 In order to do this it applies the ”cost-benefit” analysis 
project in a different location (which must be in the EEA or CEEC if the pur-
pose of the investment is the manufacture of vehicles and parts of vehicles 
c
involve an element of mobility inasmuch as a firm is often faced with the 
choice of adapting the existing plant or closing it and setting up a new 
plant225 elsewhere, either in the form of an extension or on a greenfield 
site.226 A radical change in production structure of this nature on the exist-
ing site is called a ”transformation” and may be eligible for regional aid un-
der the 1997 Frame
a
 
”Transformation” is formally defined as ”the complete dismantling of body-
work lines (motorvehicles) or power plant lines (engines) and, simultane-
ously, of the final assembly lines of the plant in question and the setting-up 
of new bodywork lines, power plant lines and final assembly lines in an 
overall production structure that is clearly different from the previous one”. 
 
3.3. Test of Proportionality/Cost-benefit Analysis of Regional Aid 
In addition to the test of necessity/mobility described above, when consid-
ering mobile aspects of a project, the Commission satisfies itself that 
the planned aid is proportionate to the regional problems it is intended to 
help resolve.
method. This method compares, with regard to the ”mobile” elements of the 
project, the costs which an investor would bear in order to carry out this 
project in the region in question with those it would bear for an identical 
                                                
224Paragraph 3.2(a), n. 19, 1997 Framework. 
225New plants means plant on a new site which has not yet been developed. 
226Paragraph 3.2(a), 1997 Framework. 
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intended largely for the European markets),228 which makes it possible to 
determine the specific handicaps of the assisted region concerned. The 
ommission then authorises regional aid within the limit of the regional 
alysis (which has been in use since 1990 
nd has wide acceptance amongst private companies and government 
 alternative location, the Commis-
ion can identify those costs and benefits. 
-
any is only comparing one European site with a site outside Europe from 
to be per-
C
handicaps resulting from the investment in the comparator plant. 
 
The basis of the ”cost-benefit” an
a
bodies) is based on the study, ”The effect of different State aid measures 
on intra-Community competition” by the Motor Industry Research Unit.229 It 
is a determination of the extent to which regional aid relates to the struc-
tural handicaps faced by an investor in the assisted area. It is also a proce-
dure for evaluating the desirability of a project by weighing its benefits 
against its cost. The Commission places itself in the position of a private 
investor when calculating costs or benefits associated with a particular lo-
cation. By comparing the investment and operating costs of the chosen 
location in the assisted area with the best
s
 
In the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis, the comparator site or bench-
mark is, in principle, situated within the EEA or CEEC if the purpose of the 
investment is the production of vehicles or car components destined, to a 
large extent, for the European markets. In those rare cases where a com
p
which it would import vehicle, the cost-benefit analysis may have 
formed with a hypothetical alternative site. In cases where the company 
can demonstrate that more than half of the production is to be sold outside 
Europe, the comparator plant for the cost-benefit analysis can be situated 
outside Europe.230 
 
If the cost-benefit analysis takes as comparator a location in another as-
sisted area (i.e. an area compatible with the Common Market as regional 
                                                                                                                          
227Paragraph 3.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
228The study of the mobility of the investment and the cost-benefit analysis may be 
carried out using different alternative locations: paragraph 3.2(c), n. 23, 1997 
nities 
230
Framework. 
229Published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Commu
 under the number ISBN 92-826-0381-4.
Paragraph 3.2, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
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aid, under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty or its equivalent Article 61(3) of the 
EEA Agreement), any difference in the regional aid rate is deemed to be 
neither an advantage nor a handicap for the cost-benefit analysis but is 
regarded as neutral by definition.231 
 
In the interests of transparency, the standard notification form attached at 
Annex II of the 1997 Framework includes in Part IIA (particularly Form 1-3) 
very specific details to be completed relating to a cost-benefit analysis. It is 
unlikely that such details, e.g. of total operating costs (including labour, 
rent, transport, machinery/equipment, etc.), could be supplied without the 
active co-operation of the beneficiary involved. However, the notification 
requirement remains formally the obligation of the Member State and the 
extent to which the beneficiary will have the opportunity to verify the cor-
rectness or otherwise of the information eventually supplied to the Com-
mission will depend to a large extent on internal procedures in the Member 
State. This may have implications for the position of the beneficiary in rela-
tion to an action to recover illegal aid. 
 
The cost-benefit analysis takes particular account of ”investment cost dif-
ferences” and ”operating cost differences”,232 discussed further below. 
 
3.3.1. Investment Cost Differences 
 
Differences in additional investment cost arising for the beneficiary between 
the desired location and the comparator one must be identified in detail. 
The analysis by the Commission considers at least five categories of cost: 
land, building and infrastructure, machinery and equipment, tools and dies 
and vendor tooling. Other categories may be identified when they corre-
pond to assets that will depreciate over their lifetime. These cost differ-
plant before and after investment) must be submitted.233 
s
ences must be explained by the beneficiary to the Commission and all 
available supporting documentation (including technical lay-outs of the 
 
                                                
231Paragraph 3.2(c), sub-paragraph 5, 1997 Framework. 
232See further paragraph 3.3, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
ussed further below, see IV.3.7. 233The requirements of confidentiality are disc
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Usually, the differences in investment cost between the two comparator 
plants requires an on-site visit by the Commission and/or its appointed ex-
perts. They are particularly concerned to establish bottlenecks in the aided 
plant in instances when a production capacity increase may be at stake.234 
ductivity which can be broken down 
s differences in wage rates, working hours and manpower); compo-
; in-
entories (differences in the financing cost of stocks for incoming material 
 a consequence of the location choice, 
.g. differences in number of days in stock on the plant and on the road); 
Studies on the choice of plant location must be submitted to the Commis-
case and 
 
3.3.2. Operating Cost Differences 
 
Differences in ”operating costs” corresponding to the first full three or five 
years of production will also have to be examined in detail. The documents 
submitted with the notification form should therefore distinguish between 
normal or permanent cost differences and start-up cost differences for each 
category. Data is to be given in the currency of the Member State (with ex-
change rate assumptions provided) and in current prices for historic years 
or constant prices for future years. 
 
The specific factors normally examined are labour costs (differences in the 
wage bill for production at optimal pro
a
nents/materials (differences in the cost of components and supplies, taking 
into account local suppliers policies, central purchasers policies, etc)
v
and finished products that appear as
e
transport (differences in cost arising for the beneficiary because of the pe-
ripheral location of the regional plant, both as regards incoming materials 
and finished products, resulting from differences in distances and unit 
transport costs); and other operating handicaps (differences in cost arising 
for the beneficiary because of the peripheral location of the regional plant, 
both as regards incoming materials and finished products, resulting from 
differences in distances and unit transport costs); and other operating 
handicaps (differences in cost of, for example, various utilities and guaran-
tees). 
 
sion whenever available in order to facilitate processing of the 
                                                
234Paragraph 3.3, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
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speed up the final decision. This implies a degree of co-operation between 
the beneficiary and the Member State authorities. 
 
3.3.3. Operational Handicaps/Effect on Cost-benefit Analysis 
 
Operational handicaps are assessed over three years in the case of ex-
ansion projects and five years in the case of new plants on greenfields 
ents with which undertakings are faced, 
amely lack of adequate infrastructure, organised logistics, a workforce 
p
sites. The Commission believes that these periods are generally consistent 
with the time needed to overcome start-up difficulties and reach target op-
erational levels in each case.235 
 
”New plant” means new plant on a new site which has not yet been devel-
oped. In such cases, compared with ”plant expansion”, the Framework 
identifies a lack of certain requirem
n
specifically trained for the needs of the undertaking and a sub-contracting 
structure. If, however, such services can be provided by a unit of the same 
group located in close proximity, the project is regarded, in accordance with 
Commission Decision 96/666/EC as an ”expansion”, even if it is actually 
built on a greenfield site.236 
 
3.3.4. Position of First-tier Component Suppliers 
 
In the case of an overall project, the ”first-tier component suppliers” con-
cerned may each benefit from the same regional handicap percentage as 
the vehicle manufacturer, as calculated by the cost-benefit analysis, no 
cost-benefit analysis being applied to them.237 However, if a first-tier com-
ponent supplier taking part in an overall project considers it has the specific 
regional handicaps that would give it a higher aid intensity, it may request a 
separate cost-benefit analysis, the results of which will be applied irre-
spective of the outcome. 
 
                                                
235Paragraph 3.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
236O.J. 1996 No. L308/46. 
237Paragraph 3.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
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3.3.5. Relationship between Cost-benefit Analysis and ”Horizontal” Aid 
 
It is important to note that if the project is to be aided under (horizontal) ob-
re discussed 
eparately below, the Commission ensures that ”eligible” expenditure and 
considering the mobile aspects of a project is 
at the planned aid is proportionate to the regional problems it is intended 
”mobile” elements of the 
roject the costs which an investor would bear in carrying out the project in 
       
jectives, e.g. environmental, R&D training, etc., all of which a
s
the ”cost-benefit” analysis does not involve any of these items, since they 
will be separately assessed and aided.238 However, the position is some-
what different for ”innovation” discussed further below, when linked to in-
vestment. Such expenditure can be aided from a regional and an innova-
tion point of view.239 
 
3.3.6. Exemption from Need for Cost-benefit Analysis 
 
The Commission intends to approve regional maps in accordance with new 
regional guidelines.240 Until then, if the intensity of the planned regional aid 
is 10 percent or less of the regional ceiling, a cost-benefit analysis will not 
be required by the Commission. This is stated to be because a mobile pro-
ject located in an assisted region (i.e. benefiting from domestic regional aid) 
is deemed always to suffer from minimum disadvantages. In other words, 
since part of the test when 
th
to help resolve, in comparing with regard to the 
p
the region in question with those it would bear for an identical project in a 
different location, the Commission accepts a minimum level of disadvan-
tage and hence of cost for locating the project in the assisted region. 
 
Thus the Commission has decided not to oppose proposed U.K. Govern-
ment aid to the Ford Motor Company at Bridgend, South Wales241 in which 
                                         
8See Paragraph 3.1, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
9Paragraph 3.1, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
240Paragraph 3.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
241Approval of a State aid pursuant to Art. 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, Cases 
where the Commission does not raise objections, State aid N781/96 – The United 
Kingdom, Summary of the Commission’s decision not to oppose the proposal of 
l aid to Ford Motor Company in support of 
e expansion of engine capacity in Bridgend, O.J. 1997 
23
23
the UK Government to provide regiona
an investment project for th
No. C139/4. 
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the proposed gross aid intensity is 2.94 percent (gge)242 whereas the re-
ional aid ceiling in Bridgend is 20 percent (nge).243 Since the net intensity 
ted that the proposed investment (in a regionally as-
isted area within Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty) helped to create 580 
ine project was also 
rucial to the long-term maintenance of engine production at the Bridgend 
aid as 
ompatible with Art. 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and Art. 61(3)(c) of the EEA 
 
Despite its minor importance in terms of aid intensity, this decision served 
 establish a new general prin-
g
of the proposed aid amounted to only 1.97 percent of the eligible costs of 
the investment, which is less than one-tenth of the allowable regional ceil-
ing, the Commission decided that not detailed analysis was to be made to 
identify separately additional cost and benefits arising for Ford from their 
decision to locate the new Zetec-SE engine production in Bridgend rather 
than elsewhere. 
 
The Commission no
s
jobs at the Bridgend production site. The Zetec-SE eng
c
plant and therefore contributed to safeguarding employment in a region of 
high unemployment, thus helping to overcome structural handicaps. How-
ever, as required by the (previous) Framework, the Commission stressed 
that in evaluating proposals to grant regional aid in the automotive sector, it 
has to assess the benefits for regional development against possible ef-
fects on the sector as a whole, such as the creation of important overca-
pacity. Moreover, in view of the sensitive nature of the motor vehicle sector 
and the high risk of unwarranted distortions of competition, it was neces-
sary to ensure that the regional aid is in proportion to the regional problem 
it seeks to remedy (the above considerations are still relevant under the 
1997 Framework). However, in view of the low proposed aid intensity com-
pared with the allowable regional ceiling, an undue advantage to the com-
pany was unlikely to be created and the Commission regarded the 
c
Agreement as it complied with the relevant Community Framework for State 
aid to the motor vehicle industry. 
as a point of departure for the Commission to
                                                
242That is to say nominal (before tax) value of grants and the discounted (before 
tax) value of interest subsidies, as a proportion of the investment cost. 
243The measure which is used in calculating the intensity of aid is the ”net grant 
equivalent” (nge) in which the tax element, which varies from one Member State to 
another, is deducted from the gross amount so as to obtain the net benefit to the 
recipient. 
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ciple by which DG IV can determine the need to assess separately the net 
incremental costs and benefits arising from the decision to locate an in-
vestment project of a company in an area eligible for regional aid as op-
posed to more developed region.244 Although exhaustive, the cost-benefit 
calculation is a relatively time-consuming and complex assessment method 
which is deemed necessary in larger cases with relatively high aid intensi-
ties. The new Commission practice will facilitate case evaluation and speed 
up its handling as well as allowing DG IV to concentrate on the most impor-
nt cases.245 
hat assisted area, it will provide it with a 
ompetitive advantage over its unaided competitors. The risk of such distor-
ta
 
After the regional guidelines are effective, and insofar as they introduce 
lower ceilings, the minimum intensity triggering the necessity for a cost-
benefit analysis to be undertaken will be 20 percent of the new regional 
ceiling.246 
 
3.4. Test of Effect of Regional Aid on Industry and Competition 
In addition to satisfying the tests of necessity/mobility and proportional-
ity/cost-benefit analysis, discussed above, the Commission proposes to 
study the effect on competition of every investment project, looking in par-
ticular at variations in production capacity (because of the structural over-
capacity in the industry)247 on the relevant market in the group concerned. 
 
The Commission has established an aid ceiling for each of the regional ar-
eas covered under Article 87(3)(a) or (c) of the EC Treaty. However, even 
when the ceiling for regional aid in the area where the project is to be de-
veloped is higher than the aid intensity proposed in favour of an automotive 
company, if the level of regional aid proposed exceeds the actual cost dis-
advantages for that company in t
c
tion of competition is particularly high in the automotive sector because the 
level of globalisation and the structural overcapacity affecting most manu-
                                                
244MEDERER, pp. 46-51 at p. 50. 
245Ibid. 
246Paragraph 3.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
247Paragraph 3.2(d), n. 25, 1997 Framework. 
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facturers leads to fierce price competition248 (on the other hand, there are 
also considerable price differentials in car prices in different EC States as is 
well known, which is also the subject of Commission investigation). 
 
There is also a tendency for disproportionate aid allocation to such projects 
because Member States and regions compete with each other to win large-
scale investment projects by multi-national automotive companies. Such 
competitive bidding may involve not only regional aid but also other hori-
zontal aid, ad hoc aid and general measures. Consequently, the Commis-
ion aims to limit regional aid to the automotive industry to what is strictly 
y the serv-
market. As such, the Commission does not, for example, make a distinction 
etween most segments of the passenger-car market unless the vehicle is 
ing vehicle or engine manufacture as well as the manufacture of the manu-
                                                
s
necessary to influence the locational choice of economically viable projects 
in the industry and thereby to avoid unjustifiable distortion of competition. 
 
3.4.1. Relevant Product Market/Substitutability 
 
The relevant product market covers the products (and possibl
ices) referred to in the investment project and their possible substitutes 
from the consumer’s standpoint (on the basis of product characteristics, 
prices and intended use) and that of the producer (plant flexibility).249 If 
substitutability is strong between different market segments or niches, the 
Commission will add those segments or niches to arrive at the relevant 
b
sufficiently distinct in its use and production mode (e.g. off-road vehi-
cles).250 
 
As most vehicle producers manufacture their own engines, the Commission 
has considered that the relevant market for engine production by a vehicle 
manufacturer is the vehicle market for which the engines are built. How-
ever, as regards component systems or modules (which are now covered 
by the 1997 Framework), the Commission is of the view that there is a 
separate market for each.251 In the event of notification of a project involv-
 Framework. 
raph 3.2(d), n. 26, 1997 Framework. 
ork. 
248Paragraph 1.1, Annex 1, 1997
249Parag
250Paragraph 2.3, Annex I, 1997 Framew
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facture of the corresponding component modules, the Commission will de-
fine the relevant market as the combination of the vehicle market and the 
markets for the different modules.252 The relevant geographic market in 
rinciple covers the EEA and the CEEC. 
e 
ost-benefit analysis. This kind of adjustment (referred to as ”top-up”) may 
e investor to move into an 
rea covered by Article 87(3)(a) or (c),254 provided that the aided invest-
licable approved maximum regional aid intensity of 20-30 percent 
et.256 
p
 
3.4.2. Market-impact Analysis: Regional ”Top-up” 
 
Aid proposals in support of projects that potentially aggravate the overca-
pacity problem of the industry can be moderated by reducing the regional 
handicap ratio.253 Conversely, a project contributing to an overall improve-
ment to the overcapacity situation can benefit from increases of up to two 
points (in assisted areas) to the regional handicap, estimated under th
c
be authorised as an additional incentive for th
a
ment will not lead to sector problems, as in the case of the Commission 
Decision not to oppose the aid which the U.K. Government intended to 
grant to Jaguar Cars Ltd. in support of an investment project.255 Part of the 
aid was a £9.4 million regional assistance grant. The purpose of the aid 
package was to help fund the launch of a new X100 sports car, the re-
placement for the XJS. It was estimated that by launching the new car, 883 
jobs would be safeguarded by 1998. The investment aid took the form of a 
grant of 12.6 EUR million to be paid in four instalments from 1994 to 1997. 
The aid intensity amounted to 11.9 percent gross, which was below the 
then app
n
 
In approving the grant, the Commission considered that the investment pro-
ject would make an important contribution to the development of the re-
                                                                                                                          
251Paragraph 2.3, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
252Paragraph 2.3, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
253The cost-benefit analysis provides for a calculation of the net incremental cost 
associated with the selection of the plant in an assisted area versus the best alter-
native location. The proportion between the present value of this net incremental 
cost and the present value of the eligible investment is called the ”regional handi-
O.J. 1994 No. C298/9. 
256See IV.3.1. 
cap ratio”. 
254EVANS, p. 318, citing Commission Decision 
255O.J. 1994 No. C298/9. 
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gions concerned; the company had actively examined various alternative 
locations for the project thereby underlining the necessity for regional aid to 
safeguard the short- and long-term prospects of the existing Jaguar loca-
tions. However, the net regional disadvantages Jaguar/Ford faced were 
und to be slightly below the level of proposed regional aid. Nevertheless, 
 to any increases in ca-
acity at group level and that the regional aid was not disproportionate in 
accepted a slight overcompensation of these disadvantages as an 
centive for the investor to move into the assisted area. 
and a case-by-case analysis of the effect of the aid to regional development 
258 It is expressed in 
e added to or subtracted from the 
fo
the Commission found that since it would not lead
p
view of the structural handicaps of the relevant regions (Birmingham, Cov-
entry and Liverpool),257 an overcompensation (1.6 percent) of these disad-
vantages could be approved even though it was slightly in excess of the 
usual permitted regional aid level, in line the Commission’s standard prac-
tice, and as an incentive for the investor to invest in these assisted areas. 
 
Similarly, the Commission had approved, in October 1994, State aid to 
FASA-Renault for its investment at Valladolid (Spain) in support of a plan to 
locate an entirely new petrol engine plant there. The Commission under-
took a comparative cost-benefit analysis (under the previous Framework) to 
establish the net regional disadvantages that FASA-Renault faced by in-
vesting in the assisted region of Valladolid. These disadvantages were 
found to be slightly below the proposed level of regional aid. However, tak-
ing into account all other changes in car and engine capacity by the same 
manufacturer at group level, the Commission concluded that the project 
would not contribute to the creation of overcapacity in the relevant sector at 
European level and would not, therefore, have any negative effects on the 
sector as a whole within the EEA. Therefore, in line with its standard prac-
tice, it 
in
 
The ”top-up” is regarded as of general application throughout the sector 
under Art. 87(3)(a) or (c) is therefore not required.
terms of percentage points which are to b
                                                
257BAYLIS, p. 8. 
14, regarding 
 authorities of the Commission’s proposal for reintroduc-
ramework on State aid to the motor vehicle sector. 
258EVANS, p. 318, citing Notice C44/95 (E16/95), O.J. 1995 No. C304/
the refusal of the Spanish
tion of the EC f
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intensity allowable, according to the cost-benefit analysis as set out in the 
1997 Framework and reproduced in the table below. 
 
 Top-up 
Impact on competitors Art. 87(3)(a) regions Art. 87(3)(c) regions 
Negligible +4 +2 
Moderate +2 +1 
High -1 -2 
 
Under the 1997 Framework,259 the impact on industry is ”high” where the 
ratio between the capacity of the group after the investment (C(f)) and the 
capacity of the group before the investment (C(i)) is 1.01 or over; the im-
act is ”moderate” where 0.99<C(f)/C(i)<1.01 or where a new segment is 
aid amounting to 16.8 million EUR or 39 percent, of investment costs was 
                                                
p
created on the relevant market; the impact is ”negligible” where C(f)/C(i) is 
0.99 or under. 
 
The distinction between Art. 87(3)(a) and Art. 92(3)(c) regions is used to 
take better account of the difficulties encountered in each region and to in-
crease the incentive effect of regional aid on investors. 
 
3.5. Intensity of Regional Aid 
The authorised aid, expressed as a gross grant equivalent (gge),260 may 
not exceed the total of the amounts calculated under the tests discussed 
earlier of necessity/mobility, eligible costs, proportionality which may in-
volve identification of regional handicaps, and effect of competition; the 
possibility of top-up has also to be considered. 
 
The aid may also not exceed the regional ceiling applicable to the type of 
undertaking concerned.261 The effect of allowing a ”top-up” may be that 
comparatively high levels of aid are authorised, such as in the case of Por-
tuguese aid to an electronic automotive components manufacturer where 
(d), 1997 Framework. 259Paragraph 3.2
260That is to say nominal (before tax) value of grants and the discounted (before 
tax) value of interest subsidies, as a proportion of the investment cost. 
261Paragraph 3.2(e), 1997 Framework. 
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allowed because it was likely to impact considerably on the economic de-
velopment of the region concerned without adversely affecting the sector at 
ommunity level.262 Similarly, aid intensity of 28.9 percent was allowed for 
Opel n eastern Germany which would lead of 2'000 direct 
and 2 reate
 
3.6. Regional Handicap” Aid Intensity”
he cost-benefit analysis provides for a calculation of the net incremental 
mber State’s proposal. Comparing both ratios, the following 
itial propositions can be put forward: 
tified amount of aid; 
the aid will serve to compensate to a certain extent the financial disad-
vantages of the geographical choice; 
 if the aid intensity is close to the regional handicap ratio, the market-im-
C
 i to the creation 
'500 indirect jobs c d.263 
End Result: ”  versus ”  
T
cost264 associated with the selection of the plant in an assisted area versus 
the best alternative location. The proportion between the present value of 
this net incremental cost and the present value of the eligible investment is 
called the ”regional handicap ratio”. The regional handicap ratio is com-
pared with the ”aid intensity” expressed in gross grant equivalent265 result-
ing from the Me
in
 
 if the aid intensity is well below the regional handicap ratio, it is as-
sumed that the beneficiary will not receive an unjus
 
 if the aid intensity is substantially higher than the regional handicap ra-
tio, it may be assumed, at this point in the analysis, that the beneficiary 
may receive an unjustified amount of aid; the aid may serve to over-
compensate the financial disadvantages of the geographical area; 
 

pact analysis, i.e. the effect of regional aid on industry and competition, 
discussed further above, will define whether the proposal is acceptable. 
 
                                                
262EVANS, p. 318, citing Notice C44/95 (E16/95), O.J. 1995 No. C304/14, regarding 
the refusal of the Spanish authorities of the Commission’s proposal for reintroduc-
tion of the EC framework on State aid to the motor vehicle sector. 
263See 22nd Report on Competition Policy, p. 234. 
stment and operating costs of the chosen 264Based on an assessment of the inve
site. 
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Thus, for example, (under the previous 1989 Framework) the European 
Commission approved regional and environmental aid from the Flemish re-
gion of Belgium to Ford Werke AG in Genk as part of an investment project 
consisting of a large extension of this plant’s production capacity, especially 
through the launching of a Ford Mondeo series. After examining the dos-
ier, the Commission came to the conclusion that the investment project 
 car manufac-
turing sector. In particular, the aid was found not to have any negative ef-
.1
tities authorised by the relevant re-
ional legislation. 
 submitted by the beneficiary (via 
e Member State) in the context of the cost-benefit analysis of regional aid 
 and 
apacity. 
ission to provide an independent technical expert report to verify data 
submitted by a potential beneficiary. Such a consultancy company faces 
s
conformed to Community criteria on regional State aid in the
fect on the automobile sector in general as aid intensity was lower than the 
regional handicap that Ford had accepted owing to the fact it was investing 
in the Genk factory which is located in a region recognised by the Commis-
sion as eligible for regional aid (”assisted area”).266 The aid took the form of 
a loan for 24.1 million EUR, tax concessions on the property amounting to 
4.5 million EUR and environmental aid in the form of a loan of 1  million 
EUR to allow reduction of polluting emissions and exhaust gases from the 
factory until they were below the quan
g
 
3.7. Confidentiality 
Most of the information and technical data
th
is communicated to the Commission under a strict requirement of confiden-
tiality.267 The cost-benefit analysis makes use, for example, of detailed in-
formation on the operating and investment cost of the project and other 
confidential information on the company’s plans for sales, production
c
 
The requirement of confidentiality is also made binding, via contractual pro-
visions to that effect, on any consultancy company employed by the Com-
m
                                                                                                                          
265That is to say nominal (before tax) value of grants and the discounted (before 
he investment cost. 
ce Europe, July 28, 1995. 
Paragraph 2.4, Annex I, 1997 Framework. For a discussion of confidentiality in 
the general context of a fair hearing, see WEATHERILL/BEAUMONT, p. 265. 
tax) value of interest subsidies, as a proportion of t
266”Commission approved Belgian Regional and Environmental aid to Ford”, 
Agen
267
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the prospect of heavy fines for breach of such confidentiality.268 There 
would arguably also be the prospect of further sanctions such as the possi-
bility of an action for damages in contract and/or tort and the real risk of no 
re-employment by the Commission. 
 
4. Assessment of Other Types of Aid under the 
1997 Framework 
In addition to the two tests of necessity and proportionality269, specific rules 
of assessment are set out in the 1997 Framework. These rules have al-
ready been examined above in relation to regional aid.270 The specific rules 
for a further seven types of aid, namely R&D aid, rescue and restructuring 
aid, investment aid for innovation, aid for environmental protection and en-
ergy saving, aid to vocational training, aid for modernisation and rationalisa-
tion, and operating aid, are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.1. Research and Development (R&D) Aid 
mework, aid for R&D will be assessed under the Com-
271 However, 
&D aid may therefore be distinguished from, for example, investment aid 
                                                
Under the 1997 Fra
munity framework for State aid for research and development.
the motor vehicle framework reiterates the requirement for the Commission 
to carry out a thorough analysis of the breakdown of costs between the 
different categories of R&D; investors must clearly distinguish industry re-
search and genuine precompetitive development from the introduction of 
new technology in the form of productive investment or competitive devel-
opment.272 
 
R
for innovation (discussed further below)273. R&D aid may not be granted, for 
example, for the development of new engines which comply with existing 
legal standards, because this is a normal industrial competitive require-
268Paragraph 2.4, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
269See IV.2.3. 
270See IV.3. 
271O.J. 1996 No. C45/5. 
272Paragraph 3.3, 1997 Framework. 
273See IV.4.3. 
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ment.274 Thus, for example, in an earlier Commission Decision of Septem-
ber 1995, the development and pre-industrialisation stages of the R&D cy-
cle, by which a new, but non-innovative truck series was prepared by the 
truck producer DAF and aided by the Dutch State, was considered by the 
ommission to be a standard development, albeit of a new model which 
 
of 1992 
es instances of aid 
ranted for R&D purposes in the motor vehicle sector. For instance, the 
enna local administration to Opel in July 1995 for, inter alia, R&D to de-
rocess also had to be considered innovative on a European level and in-
C
was less polluting and more fuel efficient than its predecessors, for a truck
company in order to remain competitive in the European market.275 By con-
trast, the Commission considered that aid paid to DAF at the end 
was in conformity with relevant guidelines for the assessment of R&D aid 
because it was linked to the VOLEM project (accelerated development of 
low emission engines) which contained a sufficient element of pre-
competitive research to justify the level of aid actually paid.276 
 
Account is taken of the commercial risk associated with the technical un-
certainty of the research.277 Earlier case law includ
g
Commission approved aid granted by the Austrian Government and the Vi-
velop a new small-size engine family with three- and four-cylinder versions, 
claiming reduced fuel consumption and emissions. Part of the aid was for 
process-related R&D and innovative investment.278 In particular, the innova-
tive character of the relevant engine lay in the need to combine a great 
number of different and often non-related technologies to compensate for 
the inherent handicaps of a three cylinder layout. Its introduction was also 
found to carry a considerable risk with regard to its smoothness and bal-
ance and thus market acceptance. Various elements of the production 
p
volved considerable risks for the company as to their efficiency and practi-
cability.279 
                                                
274EVANS, p. 315 citing Decision N657/94, O.J. 1996 No. C74/8, not to oppose the 
R&D aid which the Dutch Government intended to provide to DAF Trucks NV for 
the Volem project. 
27525th Report on Competition Policy, p. 211. 
61-66 at p. 64. 
. 1-13 at p. 8. 
 aid to Opel Austria support of R&D, Environmental and 
euter EU Briefing, August 2, 1995. Ref: 
27625th Report on Competition Policy, p. 212. 
277MORCH, pp. 
278BAYLIS, pp
279Commission approved
Training Expenditure (95/07/26), R
IP/95/833. 
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4.2. Rescue and Restructuring Aid 
4.2.1. Commission Practice Prior to the 1997 Framework 
 
Early Commission practice in the motor vehicle sector allowed aid to recipi-
ents where such restructuring aid enabled them to become competitive or 
to alleviate the social costs of restructuring. For example, restructuring aid 
for British Leyland was authorised because of the essential role it played as 
an employer in the British economy and its contribution to trade balance.280 
Similarly, aid was also authorised to create new activities for the re-em-
ployment of workers made redundant by the restructuring of Volkswagen in 
ermany281 and French aid to assist the merger of Citroën with Peugeot to G
facilitate the creation of a more profitable group.282 In 1975, rescue aid was 
authorised to Chrysler because of employment problems which would have 
been caused by plant closures in Scotland.283 The Commission also author-
ised (subject to various conditions) £469 million of the £800 million aid 
package to the Rover Group by the U.K. Government,284 which had been 
notified to it, in the form of a capital contribution aimed at a debt-write off to 
be awarded in the context of its acquisition by British Aerospace. The 
Commission noted that the proposed measure of debt write-off was pre-
sented as the last discretionary aid which the U.K. Government was to 
award the Rover Group and was clearly linked to the restructuring plan of 
the Group. It also noted that part of the Rover Group’s state of dept was 
due to unaided restructuring efforts in earlier years, which included capacity 
reductions.285 However, the Commission was concerned to ensure that the 
                                                
280EVANS, p. 313, citing 5th Report on Competition Policy, pp. 84-85. 
281Ibid. 
282Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
283Ibid., p. 85. See also, regarding Dutch aid to Volvo, Bull. EC 5-1978, 2135. 
284Commission Decision 89/58/EEC, concerning aid provided by the U.K. Govern-
rnment on purely procedural grounds: Case C-294/90 British 
CR I-5823. The Commission opened 
ed that the U.K. Government be or-
 million additional aid granted in breach of the Com-
8. 
ment to the Rover Group, an undertaking producing motor vehicles, O.J. 1989 No. 
L25/92. The U.K. Government lodged an appeal against its decision. The ECJ 
found for the Gove
Aerospace and Rover v Commission [1992] E
fresh Article 88(2) procedures which conclud
dered to repay all of the £44.4
mission’s earlier decision. 
285Commission Decision 89/58/EEC, concerning aid provided by the U.K. Govern-
ment to the Rover Group, an undertaking producing motor vehicles, O.J. 1989 No. 
L25/92, p. 9
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intensity of aid should be proportionate to the problem it was designed to 
te off £469 million which corresponded 
to 30 percent of the total restructuring cost which it felt was more in line 
 It concluded that 
e aid in the form of a debt write-off should lead to the restoration of the 
to be excessive. In July 1994, following a lengthy investigation, the Com-
also decided against certain aspects of restructuring aid for Volks-
in eastern Germany. The Commission prohibited part of the aid re-
 be-
resolve and allowed only a debt-wri
with the reduction of capacity pursued by Rover Group.286
th
company’s viability and, through the proposed restructuring, contribute to 
the avoidance of structural problems which the Community motor vehicle 
industry may face in the near future. For  these reasons the Commission 
considered that the aid permitted by it would facilitate the development of 
the sector concerned at Community level without adversely affecting trad-
ing conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.287 
 
By contrast, one decision in which the Commission concluded that the aid 
involved was not to be authorised because it was not linked to a restruc-
turing plan and could not be demonstrated as being in the Community inter-
est, related to Italian government aid of 206.2 billion and 408.9 billion lire to 
Alfa Romeo288 (the Italian Government did not attempt to justify the aid on 
other grounds, e.g. regional aid). The decision was confirmed by the ECJ 
which concluded, inter alia, that the Commission had taken into account the 
existence and effect of restructuring programmes but no such plan existed 
for Alfa Romeo and the Commission was justified in concluding that the aid 
was not related to a restructuring programme for the take-over of a private 
company.289 
 
The Commission also scaled down certain aid proposed by the Spanish 
Government for a restructuring plan of Enasa290 because it was considered 
mission 
wagen 
lating to Volkswagen’s takeover of a former East German car company
ing sold by the Treuhandanstalt. The German Government had proposed 
                                                
286Ibid., p. 99. 
287Ibid. 
288Commission Decision 89/661/EEC, concerning aid provided by the Italian Gov-
ernment to Alfa Romeo, an undertaking in the motor vehicle sector, O.J. 1989 No. 
94/9. L3
289Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603. 
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compensation of 34 million EUR for the losses of the company but the 
Commission found that thus was disproportionate to the restructuring ex-
penses and had no regional justification. The aid was found to have the 
character of operating aid which, under the (then applicable) Framework, 
could never be allowed and the Commission requested repayment of the 
incompatible aid which had been granted unlawfully, i.e. without prior notifi-
cation.291 
 
In January 1995, the Commission opened proceedings under Art. 88(2) of 
the EC Treaty in connection with a restructuring plan for Suzuki Motor SA 
(Santana) aided by national and regional governments of Spain. The Com-
ission considered that the restructuring plan was vague and unconvincing 
 aid elements contained in the public intervention of the Dutch 
tate and the Region of Flanders in favour of the truck producer DAF be-
                                                                                           
m
and did not aim to restore the long-term viability of the company.292 
 
The Commission also took a negative decision in respect of the amount of 
aid equal to the difference between the real value of the truck firm FBG on 
the market and the price fixes for the sale of the latter to Mercedes-Benz by 
the Treuhandanstalt. The Commission required part of the aid to be recov-
ered and interest paid from the date of the sale, i.e. January 1, 1994.293 
 
In September 1995, the Commission took a partly negative decision in re-
spect of two Art. 88(2) procedures opened in 1993 to examine the compati-
bility of State
S
fore and after its bankruptcy. The Commission required the Dutch State to 
recover from DAF a total of 17.9 million EUR of aid which did not comply 
with the 1989 Framework, in particular because the aid (17.7 million EUR), 
which qualified as a rescue and restructuring aid, was granted without be-
ing linked to a restructuring plan ensuring the long-term viability of the 
company. 
 
                               
/OTTERVANGER, p. 94, citing 19th Report on Competition Policy, 
292
29326th Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 189. 
290HANCHER/SLOT
point 184. 
291BAYLIS, p. 8. See further, Commission Decision of July 27, 1994 concerning aid 
granted to the Volkswagen Group for investments in the new German Bundes-
länder (94/1068/EC), O.J. 1994 No. L385/1. 
25th Report on Competition Policy, p. 212. 
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4.2.2. Rescue and Restructuring Aid under the 1997 Framework 
 
The situation under the 1997 Framework is that rescue and restructuring 
aid which is above the relevant thresholds is now to be assessed under the 
(horizontal) Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructur-
ing firms in difficulty,294 without prejudice to the second sub-paragraph of 
paragraph 3.1 of the 1997 Framework. This states that as structural over-
apacity in the motor vehicle industry is set to continue until the end of the 
ction in 
roduction capacity to be proportional to the intensity of the aid, i.e. the 
 is recognised that, in general, the European motor vehicle industry needs 
pment and is discussed above.  
                                                
c
decade, the Commission will prohibit State aid which is aimed at a net in-
crease in production capacity. 
 
In addition, the Commission will usually require a reduction in installed ca-
pacity. The Commission also considers it necessary for the redu
p
amount of the aid divided by the cost of restructuring. Restructuring aid, like 
rescue aid, is in principle intended to be a one-off operation. 
 
4.3. Investment Aid for Innovation 
It
to improve its competitiveness as compared with its competitors in the 
United States, Korea and Japan. The technical and industrial gap with 
these countries is illustrated by the average time required to build a vehicle: 
25 hours in Europe, 22 hours in the United States and 16 hours in Japan.295 
”Innovation” in this context means ”the development and industrialisation in 
Europe, the EEA and the countries of CEEC of genuinely or substantially 
new products or process, that is products or process which have not yet 
been used or marketed by other parties operating in the industry”.296 It may 
therefore be distinguished from R&D aid which relates more to precompeti-
tive develo 297
 
294Currently the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructur-
, as revised by Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and 
ing Firms in Difficulty, O.J. 1994 No. C368/12, hereinafter referred to as ”Rescue 
Guidelines”
restructuring firms in difficulty, O.J. 1997 No. C283/2, (”the 1997 Rescue Guide-
lines”). 
295Paragraph 3.4, n. 28, 1997 Framework. 
296Paragraph 3.4, 1997 Framework. 
297See IV.4.1. 
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Previous Commission practice suggests that aid for innovation must relate 
 product where, for example, ”exceptionally high levels of automation and 
erent competi-
ve environment from most car manufacturers. 
A genuine innovation carries a risk of failure and the Commission will take 
n
 a
e and thus market acceptance. 
arious elements of the production process also had to be considered in-
to
productivity, world first standards of flexibility, speed in model changeover, 
system reliability and product design” are involved.298 In December 1988, 
loans to Citroën and SMAE were found not to involve modernisation invest-
ment, but genuine innovations at Community level which could therefore be 
exempted by the Commission under Article 87(3)(c), whereas a loan to 
Peugeot contributing to the modernisation of plant and the rejuvenation of 
products was not considered as innovatory and was hence incompatible 
with Article 87 EC.299 
 
The Commission did, however, approve the innovation programme of Fer-
rari in Italy (decision of September 13, 1989).300 In that case the Commis-
sion took account of the fact that the programme would not increase the 
company’s production capacity. It also noted that Ferrari is a low-volume 
producer of high-quality cars and therefore operates in a diff
ti
 
account of the scale of this risk when it assesses the intensity of the aid 
envisaged. For instance, (under the previous Framework) the Commission 
approved aid granted by the Austrian Government and the Vienna local ad-
ministration to Opel in July 1995 for R&D to develop a new small-size en-
gine family with three-and four-cylinder versions, claiming reduced fuel co -
sumption and emissions. Part of the aid was for process related to innova-
tive investment.301 In particular, the innovative character of the relevant en-
gine lay in the need to combine a great number of different and often non-
related technologies to compensate for the inherent handicaps of  three-
cylinder layout. Its introduction was also found to carry a considerable risk 
with regard to its smoothness and balanc  
V
                                                
298EVANS, p. 315, citing Notice C45/91 (ex NN255/91), O.J. 1993 No. C37/15, re-
garding the proposal of the Italian authorities to provide State aid to the Fiat Group 
in support of its second Mezzogiorno investment plan. 
299Commission Decision 89/305/EEC concerning aid from the French Government 
r, Peugeot SA, O.J. 1989 No. L123/52. 
7-97 at p. 91. 
 
to an undertaking in the motor vehicle secto
300Cited by BUIGES/MEIKLEJOHN, pp. 6
301BAYLIS, p. 8.
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novative on a European level and involved considerable risks for the com-
pany as to their efficiency and practicability.302 
 
An innovative project must concern only one plant location (or a small num-
ber of sites if different complementary sub-projects take place on a small 
number of sites303) within the same group in the motor vehicle industry; no 
aid will be granted for parts of the project carried out in other branches of a 
group. 
 
Investment aid for innovation will therefore only be authorised in duly justi-
ed cases as an incentive to industrial or technological risk-taking. The 
nother category of eligible aid specified in the 1997 Framework is that of 
fi
maximum intensity of such aid is set at 10 percent of all eligible costs, cor-
responding to engineering activities and investments of direct and exclusive 
relevance to the innovative part of the project.304 
 
4.4. Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy Saving 
A
environmental protection and energy saving. Prior to this, environmental aid 
was also permitted under the earlier 1989 Framework. In July 1995, the 
Commission approved regional and environmental aid from the Flemish re-
gion of Belgium (which was an ”assisted area” and hence eligible for do-
mestic regional aid) to Ford Werke in Genk. The aid was part of project to 
increase production capacity in relation to the new Ford Mondeo series and 
included environmental aid of 1.1 EUR million.305 
 
Aid granted under the horizontal framework, i.e. Community guidelines on 
State aid for environmental protection,306 may be regarded as compatible 
with the 1997 Framework for the motor vehicle industry.307 Under Commis-
                                                
302Commission approved aid to Opel Austria support of R&D, Environmental and 
Training Expenditure (95/07/26), Reuter EU Briefing, August 2, 1995. Ref: 
IP/95/833. 
303Paragraph 3.5, n. 28, 1997 Framework. 
ion to Opel, inter alia, envi-
, 1997 Framework. 
304Paragraph 3.4, 1997 Framework. 
305BAYLIS, p. 7. The Commission also approved, in July 1995, aid granted by the 
Austrian government and the Vienna local administrat
ronmental improvements in relation to emission controls which reached standards 
in line with Community guidelines. 
306O.J. 1994 No. L72/3. 
307Paragraph 3.5
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sion practice (in relation to earlier motor vehicle frameworks), for instance, 
aid for general pollution was accepted, in line with the relevant Guidelines 
n State aid for environmental protection. Thus, in relation to Commission’s 
d to the recycling of these effluents, which either went beyond the 
levant national standards or were voluntary measures in these sense that 
ply new technology in the 
ainting system so as to reduce pollution.309 Switching from the present 
ed paint method 
would make it possible to reduce emissions well beyond current mandatory 
q lified for the derogations 
rovided for in Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and Article 61(3)(c) of the 
The above (horizontal) environmental protection Guidelines involve com-
o
approval of aid in 1995 for Opel Austria, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gen-
eral Motors Corporation based in Aspern/Vienna, the Commission accepted 
that the investment in new cleaning and washing process for the relevant 
engine components would lead to a significant reduction in effluent emis-
sion an
re
no standards then existed. The proposed aid intensity of 30 percent was 
also found to be within the limits then foreseen by the Guidelines.308 
 
On 23rd May 1997, the Commission decided not to raise any objection to 
aid granted by Spain for a project designed to ap
p
system based on organic solvents to the new water-bas
standards. The total environmental protection investment involved in the 
project amounted to 13 million EUR but the eligible cost calculated on the 
basis of the criteria set out in the (previous) 1989 motor vehicle Framework 
and in the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
was 3.4 million EUR. The reduction took account of the savings generated 
under the new method. Consequently the aid was provided in the form of a 
direct grant applying the intensity ceiling of 30 percent of the eligible costs. 
The Commission took the view that the aid ua
p
EEA Agreement, since the aid does not affect trade to an extent contrary to 
the common interest. 
 
plex technical evaluations of matters such as ”ecological” costs incurred by 
the investor. The Commission also makes a thorough study, under those 
                                                
308Commission approved aid to Opel Austria support of R&D, Environmental and 
Training Expenditure (95/07/26), Reuter EU Briefing, August 2, 1995. Ref: 
IP/95/833. 
309State aid, Main developments between April 1, and July 15, 1997, Summary of 
t development, Competition Policy Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 
citing Case N669/96. 
the most important recen
2, Summer 1997, pp. 42-48 at p. 48, 
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Guidelines, of the cost savings on energy, raw material and so on, which 
the investor has secured as a result of the environmental protection com-
ponent in the project, so that there is no unnecessary subsidy. 
 
4.5. Aid for Vocational Training 
The 1997 Framework repeats the philosophy of its predecessor, in that if 
confirms that the Commission has a generally positive attitude towards 
training, retraining and reconversion programmes. State aid for such pur-
poses will, however, be scrutinised to ensure that it is not used solely to 
reduce the costs a firm would normally have to bear.310 
 
In July 1995, the Commission approved aid to Opel granted by the Austrian 
government and the Vienna local administration311 which included, inter 
alia, aid for basic training (0.6 million EUR) and on-the-job training (0.5 mil-
lion EUR). The Commission considered that such levels fell within the crite-
ria set out in the (earlier) Framework and that the training measures pro-
posed would correspond to genuinely qualitative changes in the required 
skills of the workforce.312 The basic training elements were not considered 
to be company specific. On this basis and since the level of aid was found 
to be within reasonable limits, the proposed aid for training was considered 
acceptable according to the (then) rules on aid for vocational training under 
the (earlier) Framework for aid to the motor vehicle industry. 
 
In March 1995, the Commission also decided not to oppose aid which the 
U.K. government granted to Jaguar Cars Ltd in support of an investment 
project which consisted, in part, of a £1.8 million training grant. In view of 
the fact that the subsidised training consisted entirely of courses providing 
eneral vocational skills which were not specifically related to the motor 
that it did not favour a particular industry or the production of certain goods. 
g
vehicle industry and could thus be applied to companies in other sectors of 
the industry, the Commission considered that this measure did not consti-
tute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty in the sense 
The Commission has stated its intention to adopt a (horizontal) Community 
                                                
310Paragraph 3.6, 1997 Framework. 
311BAYLIS, p. 8. 
312Ibid. 
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framework on training aid which it intends to apply also to the motor vehicle 
industry.313 
 
4.6. Aid for Modernisation and Rationalisation 
isation and rationalisation may be granted 
bove. However, aid 
r modernisation and rationalisation should be financed from a company’s 
 authorised by 
e Commission, even in assisted areas (i.e. those eligible for domestic 
No aid for the purpose of modern
to undertakings in the motor vehicle industry.314 Aid for modernisation and 
rationalisation, which may for example, involve keeping relevant equipment 
up-to-date, is to be distinguished from aid for innovation, such as the devel-
opment of new equipment. Aid for innovation is permissible under the con-
ditions laid down by the Framework 1997, referred to a
fo
own funds as an essential function of remaining competitive on a world 
market, i.e. if an undertaking is unable to finance its own modernisation, its 
ability to compete and its viability will eventually disappear. 
 
4.7. Operating Aid 
Operating aid is to be distinguished from aid for innovation and from mod-
ernisation and rationalisation aid, discussed above.315 The 1997 Frame-
work takes a strict view (as did its 1989 predecessor) that operating aid 
creates lasting distortions of competition in sectors such as the motor vehi-
cle industry and that therefore no new operating aid will be
th
regional aid).316 Furthermore, on the basis of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty 
the Commission will suggest that Member States currently granting this 
type of aid under existing schemes should gradually abolish operating aid 
benefiting one or several undertakings in the motor vehicle industry. 
 
The Commission Decision to authorise certain aid to Rover317 displays ele-
ments relating to both operating aid and restructuring aid. In relation to the 
former, the Commission found that £231 million of the notified aid to the 
                                                
313Paragraph 3.6, 1997 Framework. 
314Paragraph 3.7, 1997 Framework. 
315See IV.4.2. ff. 
316Paragraph 3.8, 1997 Framework. 
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Rover Group was not true financial debt but working capital which 
amounted to operating aid and could not be exempted. The items involved 
hich were regarded as operating aid included the financing of stocks of 
. certain guarantees offered 
on cars sold in the U.S.), direct and indirect costs arising from strikes which 
s indicated its intention to scrutinise an aid scheme for 
the 1995-1997 period. It 
constitute an on-going advantage to the company concerned. The Umea 
                                                                   
w
finished vehicles, certain long-term accruals (i.e
took place in 1988 which were regarded as ordinary operating costs, and 
certain interest payments on debt.318 
 
In July 1994, the Commission decided, after a lengthy investigation, that 
certain aspects of restructuring aid for Volkswagen in eastern Germany 
(relating to Volkswagen’s takeover of a former East German car company, 
Sächsische Automobilbau GmbH which was being sold by the Treuhandan-
stalt had the character of operating aid319 under an earlier motor vehicle 
framework and were therefore incompatible with it (there was found to be 
no regional justification for the aid). 
 
The Commission ha
a Volvo Trucks cabin plan in Umea, Sweden which provides subsidies un-
der a regional ”transport aid” scheme, officially approved by the Commis-
sion in February 1997, designed to offset the high cost of inbound and out-
bound deliveries to and from installations in remote Nordic areas. The aid is 
paid in reimbursements against the presentation of transport invoices and 
compensation is limited to cost incurred on Swedish territory. Although 
Sweden and Finland negotiated this ”transport aid” concept during acces-
sion negotiations in 1994 the Commission believes that the aid may never-
theless not be compatible with the provisions of the (previous) Framework 
for motor vehicle and has decided to open a formal inquiry into the Swedish 
authorities’ grant of some 11 million EUR during 
has been suggested by the Commission that such subsidies should not be 
authorised even in disadvantaged regions such as remote Nordic areas, 
since they relieve the company of part of its normal running costs and thus 
                                                       
ecision 89/58/EEC concerning aid provided by the U.K. Govern-
king producing motor vehicles, O.J. 1989 No. 
L25/92. 
318Ibid. at p. 96. 
319BAYLIS, p. 9. 
317Commission D
ment to the Rover Group, an underta
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plant turned out some 40,000 lorry cabs in 1995 with its 1860 workers and 
has finished a series of significant investments so as to be regarded as the 
most up-to-date cabin manufacturer in Europe320. In view of this, the argu-
ment put forward by the Commission is that the company cannot therefore 
claim that without national transport aid it would be more cost-effective to 
relocate production of cabins to another area. 
 
4.8. Cost of Land for Industrial Sites in the Motor Vehicle Sector 
r-Benz after the terms of the proposed 
ale had been amended and Daimler agreed to bear site preparation 
The 1997 Framework does not expressly create a specific category or type 
of aid relating to the acquisition of land by motor vehicle manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, details relating to the acquisition of land feature in many 
questions on the notification form (discussed below). The Commission has 
specifically investigated the sale of land in a number of cases. In 1987, it 
approved the sale of land to Daimle
s
costs321. However, in 1991, the Commission opened Art. 88(2) proceedings 
in respect of the sale by the Berlin Senate to Daimler-Benz AG of a very 
large site near the Berlin Wall to Daimler at a price more than 400 percent 
below market value.322 The Commission also issued a Decision disapprov-
ing the sale of a 580 acre site at Burnaston by the Derbyshire County 
Council which involved a subsidy of £4.2 million to Toyota.323 The Commis-
sion has since issued a Notice concerning the sale of land by public au-
thorities. 
 
                                                
320”State Aid: Commission investigates transport aid to Volvo plant”, European 
Report, No. 2244, July 26, 1997 at p. 1. 
321HANCHER/SLOT/OTTERVANGER, p. 49. 
322HANCHER/SLOT/OTTERVANGER, p. 50 citing Commission Communication pursuant 
y) and Daimler-Benz AG, C3/91, Germany (91/C/128/05), O.J. 1991 No. 
T/OTTERVANGER, p. 50 citing O.J. 1992 No. L6/36. 
to Art. 88(2) of the EC Treaty to other Member States and interested parties re-
garding the land purchase agreement of 16 July 1990 between the Land of Berlin 
(German
C128/3. 
323HANCHER/SLO
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5. Notification Rules under the 1997 Framework 
5.1. Categories of Aid to be Notified/Relevant Thresholds 
The 1997 Framework specifically identifies three categories of aid which 
are subject to prior notification on the basis of Article 88(3) of the EC 
and restructuring aid for firms in difficulty.324 Each category is discussed 
eeds the threshold of 50 million EUR (previously 17 million EUR) 
r the total gross aid for the project, whether State aid or aid from Commu-
nity instruments (e.g. Structural Funds and framework programmes) and 
irrespective of the form and objectives of the measure, exceeds 5 million 
EUR (unchanged from the 1989 Framework). 
 
                                                
Treaty. They are aid under an approved scheme, ad hoc aid and rescue 
below. 
 
A ”scheme” is a measure taken by a Member State, usually in the form of 
legislation, which lays down conditions of eligibility for aid, the ceilings and 
intensity of the aid available, and the machinery for payment. A scheme dif-
fers from a ”one-off”, ”ad-hoc” or ”specific” measure in that it is not aimed at 
a particular firm, but rather at a class of firms whose identities and number 
are still undefined. The scheme is said to be ”applied” every time a frim is to 
receive aid under it on the conditions which the Commission sets out in the 
authorising decision.325 
 
All aid which public authorities plan to grant to an individual project or an 
overall project under authorised aid schemes, for a firm or firms operating 
in the motor vehicle industry, is subject to prior notification if either the 
nominal amount of the investment project326 or the total cost of the pro-
ject327 exc
o
324Paragraph 2.2, 1997 Framework. 
325Competition law in the European Communities, Vol. IIB, Explanation of the rules 
ed as an investment by an undertaking in 
applicable to State aid, Situation in December 1996 (1997), European Commission 
at pp. 29-30. 
326An investment project is usually defin
ne , expand, modernise or rationalise produc-
tion facilities on a specific industrial site: paragraph 2.2(a), n. 14, 1997 Framework. 
327The total cost of a project is defined as the total expenditure by an undertaking 
on the acquisition of new tangible and intangible fixed assets which are part of an 
investment project and will be depreciated (or leased) during their lifetime. Conse-
w assets that are necessary to set up
 
 - 79 -
The Commission will analyse the projects of the manufacturer and each 
first-tier component supplier in order to determine the compatibility of each 
uld not be artifi-
cially broken down into several sub-projects and/or over several financial 
rescue and restructuring aid329 must 
unless it com-
riate form to be obtained from the Directorate Gen-
ral for Competition.331 Annex II is very detailed and includes the standard 
accounts (including details of 
rnover and net profit) for the current year and previous two years. The 
project classification, i.e. the aid objective (mobile regional investment, res-
of the aid measures envisaged. An investment project sho
years in order to avoid the obligation to notify. 
 
Ad hoc aid,328 i.e. any aid which the public authorities intend to grant out-
side an approved scheme to one or more undertakings operating in the 
motor vehicle, or aid classifiable as 
also be notified in advance under Art. 88(3) of the EC Treaty 
plies with the thresholds and rules of the Commission notice and the new 
regulation on the de minimis rule for State aid.330 
 
5.2. Notification Form 
State aid must be notified directly to the Secretariat General of the Com-
mission on the form attached at Annex II to the 1997 Framework and sup-
plemented by an approp
e
notification from and forms relating to the ”cost-benefit analysis”. It is as-
sumed that the forms will be completed with the assistance of the benefici-
ary in view of the considerable amount of technical and market information 
required as well as details of the beneficiaries own operational costs, etc. 
The administrative costs involved for the beneficiary company in terms of 
time and expertise in compiling the forms should not be underestimated. 
 
Among the general information required in every case are the group and 
(beneficiary) company’s most recent financial 
tu
cu ion, environment protection and energy 
savings or training) are to be clearly identified. 
e, restructuring, R&D, innovat
                                                                                                                          
quently, the cost is equal to the amount of capital invested in a project: paragraph 
2.2(a), n. 15, 1997 Framework. 
328Paragraph 2.2(b), 1997 Framework. 
329Paragraph 2.2(c), 1997 Framework. 
330Council Regulation No. 69/2001 (O.J. 2001 No. L10/30), Commission Notice on 
the de minimis rule for State aid (O.J. 1996 No. C68/9), see also II.3.3. 
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The form also requires a project overview, with a brief description, where 
relevant, of the products, market segments and, if the project results in a 
transfer of activity from another area, relevant details. Project details also 
include the exact location, whether it is in an assisted area or not, and the 
roject timing, i.e. start and end dates of investment cash-flow. 
hether public or private), 
ational public body and Community assistance. 
The information relating to public assistance also requires further elabora-
ort 
sted and the State aid net present value (i.e. State aid cash flow dis-
is is so. Presumably this will 
assist in the Commission’s decision about whether the envisaged support is 
                                                               
p
 
The details of the total project cost are broken down into specific heads of 
budget which include capital costs, land, buildings, plant and machinery, 
equipment, intangible and other items. Details of project financing require a 
breakdown of the various sources of investment from own resources, pri-
vate capital contributions, external borrowing (w
n
 
tion to indicate the type of public aid scheme involved (i.e. grant, interest 
subsidy, tax credit, loan, loan guarantee, equity participation, reduction in 
social security contributions), the nature of the scheme (i.e. approved aid 
schemes: regional development, R&D, training, environmental protection, 
energy saving, ad hoc, its national legal basis (i.e. law, regulation or other 
legal form describing the conditions under which public support may be 
granted) and the public entity (i.e. national, regional, local authority) provid-
ing the support. 
 
The gross grant equivalent (gge)332 of each of the types of public supp
li
counted to the base year by using the official discount rate over the appro-
priate investment period) must also be calculated in accordance with the 
relevant document published/communicated by the Commission. 
 
The form also requires an indication of envisaged public support which 
does not represent aid an explanation of why th
genuinely outside the scope of Art. 87 of the EC Treaty. It also requires de-
                                                           
331Paragraph 2.2(d), 1997 Framework. 
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tail of pending applications for public support, at company and/or group 
the models, 
e. product type including different versions (e.g. Ford Mondeo, Renault 
 addition, overall company sales for all models in million/thousands of 
dies on the final plant location site should be provided 
herever available. 
e. labour, 
omponents/material, rent, inventory, carrying costs, energy/water, tele-
level, for public support in Europe and the authorities involved (i.e. Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD), R&D funds, etc.). 
 
A separate form for Market Information requires description of 
i.
Laguna, etc.) supplied by the Group within the EEA, in order of importance 
on the relevant market. Market forecasts expressed in million/thousands of 
units are also required for each model, on the national market, other EEA 
markets333, CEEC markets334, the rest of the world. A grand total of these is 
also needed. 
 
In
units are required for the national market, other EEA markets, CEEC mar-
kets, the rest of the world, and in total. Sales in national market and other 
EEA markets must include imports. An indication of forecast group sales 
volumes (including imports) expressed in million/thousands of units is also 
required for the above categories. The effect on the project in terms of ca-
pacity, employment, production, and market share (domestic, other EEA 
and non-EEA) must be specified. Member States should attach any rele-
vant supporting documents to the notification forms. As regards regional aid 
in particular, stu
w
 
A separate set of forms in Annex II deal with mobile investment projects in 
an assisted area (i.e. one that is eligible for domestic regional aid) and in-
clude detailed information relevant to the cost-benefit analysis. It requires, 
in particular, a detailed description of total operating costs (i.
c
communications, outward transport, training, other) and total investment 
                                                                                                                          
332That is to say nominal (before tax) value of grants and the discounted (before-
tax) value of interest subsidies, as a proportion of the investment cost. 
333EEA markets are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gree-
ce, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
y. 
334 epublic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Kingdom, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norwa
CEEC markets are: Bulgaria, Czech R
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costs (i.e. land purchase, building/construction, machinery/equipment, tools 
and dies, supplier tooling, other) and details of other costs. 
 
The net incremental costs (i.e. by reference to the total operating costs and 
tal investment costs) for implementing the project in the disadvantaged 
t rate over the appropriate investment period) of investment 
osts in Location A (operating costs and investment costs) should be ex-
r both Location A and B are also required. Finally, the 
etails for the mobile investment project in an assisted area require the 
Member States may contact the Commission in advance of a formal notifi-
stance, the 
 is required (e.g. a project at or near 
to
area (Location A) as opposed to the commercially viable alternative (Loca-
tion B) must be specified. In addition, the eligible investment (i.e. net share 
of the investment which is considered to be eligible for State aid by the na-
tional administration according to the aid scheme) and the handicap inten-
sity (i.e. net incremental costs referred to above) divided by the net present 
value (i.e. value of cash-flows discounted to the base year by using the 
official discoun
c
pressed as a percentage. 
 
A separate form covers details of cost-benefit analysis assumptions in Lo-
cation A. This includes, in particular, the Group’s plants and their produc-
tion capacities in thousands of units before and after the investment project 
as well as an indication of whether the production capacity would be shifted 
from one plant to another following the project’s implementation or within 
the time scope of the project. 
 
A third form deals with cost-benefit assumptions in Location B. Sales and 
Costs breakdowns fo
d
completion of Form 6, relating to Public Support. This requires a breakdown 
of support type (i.e. grants, equity participation, loans, loan guarantees, tax 
relief/credit, reduction in social security contributions, other) and an esti-
mate of public support in gross grant equivalent (gge) and State aid net 
present value terms. 
 
cation to obtain informal advice to ensure that the subsequent notification is 
as complete as possible. This is particularly relevant when, for in
existence of aid within certain measures is uncertain; the aid measure 
rves more than one objective (e.g. hse orizontal and sectoral aid); when it is 
doubtful whether a cost-benefit analysis
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the relevant thresholds or when a company has not carried out a location 
study). 
 
5.3. Investigation and Approval by the Commission 
Upon registration of the notification, the Commission will inform the Mem-
ber State as soon as possible and usually within 15 working days about any 
information which may be lacking in order to make the notification complete 
for an assessment of all aspects of the case. At the same time, it will pro-
pose to the Member State a meeting in its offices or on the site of the in-
vestment to discuss the information already received and to be received.335 
In cases where there may be considerable cost differences between the 
two comparator location sites, it is likely that the Commission’s experts will 
want to visit the relevant sites. 
n-making. Following that meeting, the Com-
ission will confirm its final request for further information in writing.336 
representatives of the beneficiary undertaking in its 
elegation. Any errors and misinterpretations can then still be corrected be-
 
On this occasion, the Member State and the Commission can be assisted 
by appropriate experts so that all technical and financial information can be 
discussed in detail. During the meeting, missing information for a full as-
sessment of the case will be identified by the Commission and agreement 
reached by all parties on supportive material to be provided and on the pro-
spective timetable for decisio
m
 
Once the additional information requested by the Commission is received, 
the decision will normally be adopted within 30 working days for notified aid 
under an approved aid scheme(s) or two months for notified ad hoc aid. 
However, within this deadline the Commission will invite the Member State 
(which can, if appropriate, be assisted by experts) to review the cost-benefit 
analysis in a meeting in Brussels. It may well be in the interest of the Mem-
ber State to include 
d
fore a final decision is arrived at. 
 
                                                
335Paragraph 4.3, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
336Paragraph 4.2, Annex I, 1997 Framework. 
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5.4. Ex-post Control 
A copy of the final (signed) aid contract between the Member State and the 
ndertaking concerned must be sent to the Commission immediately.337 In 
onitoring and assess-
Member State. It should also include actual 
chievements. 
l port 
iving data on all aid, whatever its form, granted in the past year to under-
riginal language. 
                                                
u
its decision, the Commission may require ex post m
ment of aid already granted, the amount of detail varying according to the 
case and the potential distortion of competition. 
 
In order to enable the Commission to check compliance with its decision, 
the Member State, with the assistance of the aid recipients, must submit 
either an interim report on the aid payments or an interim report on per-
formance of the aid contract. This is to be followed by a final report on the 
objectives, in terms of timetable, investment and compliance with the spe-
cific conditions imposed by the 
a
 
The ex post monitoring mechanism appears to be far more rigorous than 
under the previous (1989) regime. 
 
5.5. Annual Report 
In addition to the ex post reporting obligations outlined above, Member 
States are also requested to provide the Commission with an annua re
g
takings in the motor vehicle industry.338 Aid which does not have to be noti-
fied must also be mentioned in the annual report. This includes all aid 
which falls below the relevant thresholds but may arguably not include 
grants of de minimis aid. 
 
The annual report (for which there is a model form) must be sent by the 
Member State by April 1 of the year following the reference year to the Di-
rectorate General for Competition. They may, at the request of a Member 
State, be communicated in their o
 
337Paragraph 2.3, 1997 Framework. 
338Paragraph 2.4, 1997 Framework. 
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5.6. Aid under Community Instruments 
k. These include measures 
nanced by the Structural Funds or benefiting from aid from the European 
One of the thresholds for notification of aid, namely 5 million EUR for total 
gross aid irrespective of source, i.e. whether State aid or aid from Commu-
nity instruments, implies a duty on the Commission to monitor all aid appli-
cations and authorisations under Community instruments339 and ensure 
that they are consistent with the 1997 Framewor
fi
Investment Bank (EIB) or other financial instruments. 
                                                
339Paragraph 2.5, 1997 Framework. 
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V. Conclusion 
Aid to the automobile sector has in, the period prior to the entry into force of 
the 1997 Framework, given rise to some major disputes between the Com-
mission and the Member States. The impression one gets from reading the 
Commission’s decisions and notices is that the Commission is gradually 
getting a grip on these extensive aid operations. 
 
In all the major disputed, prior to the entry into force of the 1997 Frame-
work, other Member States have not hesitated to submit their comments. It 
seems likely that such representations did provide the Commission with 
active support for its developing policy. It is striking that in the period after 
the entry into force of the framework, Member States have not made much 
use of the possibility to come forward with comments. 
 
Another point to note is that the Commission did achieve extensive restruc-
turing of the industry. As Advocate General Van Gerven noted in his opin-
ion in the Alfa Romeo case, both the Renault and the Rover aid operation 
did involve a restructuring plan. In the absence of such a restructuring plan 
the Commission had, according to the Court, correctly applied Art. 87 of the 
EC Treaty and therefore not violated the equal treatment principle.340 
 
The operation of the 1997 Framework appears to have enabled the Com-
mission to strengthen its control of aid in the automobile sector. 
                                                
 [1991] ECR I-1603. 340Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission
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